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ABSTRACT
MODELING THE SOFTWARE FAILURE PROCESS AND 
SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Savaş Dayanik
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ülkü Gürler 
September, 1996
Бог the last few deccides, the computer systems have replaced the man power 
in many important areas of life. Financial markets, production and service 
systems are controlled either fully by the computers or by the managers who 
extensively use the computers. Therefore, a major failure of a computerized 
system iriciy end up with a catastrophe that may affect a hirge number of 
people adversely, for this reason, reliability of computer systems attracts tlie 
attention of the researchers and practitioners.
Software is one of the major component of a computer system. Therefore, 
in this thesis, we study the stochastic nature of the failure process of a software 
during the debugging phase. We propose a mathematical model for the software 
fciilure process which may also lead to prediction of future reliability. Different 
from many other available software relicibility models, we particularly try to 
incorporate the structural properties of a softwcire such as the number ol its 
different instruction paths cuid their logical complexities. The debugging phase 
is assumed to be composed of successive test sessions. Distribution functions 
of the length of a test session and the remaining number ol faults cifter a 
test session are computed. A stopping condition lor the debugging phase is 
proposed.
Keywords: Software Reliability, Software faults, Markov Renewal Processes, 
Spatial Poisson Processes.
IV
ÖZET
BİLGİSAYAR BOZULMA SÜRECİNİN VE BİLGİSAYAR 
YAZILIM GÜVENİLİRLİĞİNİN MODELLENMESİ
Savaş Dayarnk
Endüstri Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ülkü Gürler 
Eylül, 1996
Son yıllarda, bilgisayarlı sistemler yaşamımızdaki bir çok önemli alanda in­
san işgücünün yerini cddılar. Finans piyasaları, üretim ve servis sistemleri ya 
tamamen bilgisayarlar ya da yoğun olarak bilgisayarları kullanan yöneticiler 
tarafından kontrol ediliyorlar. Bu yüzden, bir bilgisaycir sisteminin bozulması, 
bir çok insanı kötü etkileyebilecek bir felaketle sonuçlcuıabilir. Bu sebeble, bil­
gisayar sistemlerinin güvenilirliği, araştırmacıların ve uygulayıcıların dikkatini 
çekmiştir.
Yazılım bir bilgisayar sisteminin önemli parçalarmdandır. Bu yüzden, bu 
tezde, yazılımın bozulma süreci için bir mcitematiksel model önerdik. Varolan 
birçok yazılım güvenilirlik modellerinden farklı olarak, yazılımın güvenilirliğini 
daha doğru tahmin edebilmek için, özellikle, farklı komut dizgelerinin sayısı ve 
karmaşıklıkları gibi bir yazılımın yapısal özelliklerini modelimizde kullandık. 
Hatalardan ayrıştırma sürecinin birbirini takip eden sınama oturumlarından 
oluştuğu varsayıldı. Sınama oturumlarının uzunluğunun ve her sınama oturu­
mundan sonra kalan hataların sayısının dağılım işlevleri bulunmuştur. Hatci- 
lardcui ayrıştırma süreci için bir durma koşulu önerilmiştir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Yazılım Güvenilirliği, Yazılım Hataları, Markov Ye­
nilenme Süreçleri, Uzamscd Poisson Süreçleri.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature 
Review
Nowadays, computers are extensively used in numerous areas: They control 
expensive machines in the manufacturing systems, continuously check and reg­
ulate vital parameters in the nuclear power stations, maintain many commu­
nication networks, control traffic flow in the airport and in the cities, keep 
and process enormous amount of data in financial markets, etc. Therefore, 
malfunction of computer systems can result in disasters. This fact leads the 
researchers to study the methods to measure reliability of the computer sys­
tems. Unfortunately, classical reliability theory is not sufficient to model the 
reliability of such systems.
Computer systems are composed of two major parts: Hardware and Soft­
ware. Hardware systems are subject to aging. Therefore, the classical reliability 
theory can be applied to them. However, unlike hardware systems, software 
systems are not subject to physical stress and fatigue. They stay as good as 
new regardless of how old they are. On the other hand, softwares are still 
opt to fail like hardwares, but the characteristics of software failure process is 
different from those of hardware failure process.
Before mentioning the differences between them, we want to emphasize why
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Figure 1.1: Hardware and Software Cost Trends
it is important to study software reliability along with hardware reliability.
Shooman [32] figures out the shares of hardware and software in computer 
system development costs between the years 1955 and 1985 (see Figure 1.1).
Hardware systems become cheaper due to technological advances in inte­
grated circuit technology. But, cost of developing a software increases:
The basic problem in the software area is that the complexity of 
tasks which software must perform has grown faster than the tech­
nology for designing, testing and managing software development. 
Furthermore, software costs are primarily labor intensive, rather 
than technologically dependent, and man-hours spent on software 
development are roughly proportional to the size of the program 
measured in lines of code... Thus, a software complexity has in­
creased over the years, the man-hours for a typical project have 
increased, as have labor costs due to inflation. By contrast, the 
advances in integrated circuit technology have resulted in a relative 
decrease in hardware costs. The net result is that an increasingly 
larger portion of computer system development costs are due to 
software...
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For a product which requii'es large volume production, the im­
pact of development costs on the per unit production cost can be 
small. The manufacturing cost of hardware includes parts, assem­
bly, inspection and test. The manufacturing cost of software in­
cludes the small cost of storage media (disks or tapes), the operator 
and computer time cost of copying the master version of the pro­
gram and the cost of printing extx'a copies of the pertinent operating 
manuals... [32]
Thus, to reduce the contribution of software development in the cost of the 
entire computer system, computer scientists develop various software design 
and testing methods. At this point, a quantitative measuring tool is required 
to compare the performances of alternative methodologies. Software reliability 
metrics can help the developers not only to produce a high-quality product 
but evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of software engineering processes. 
Musa discusses three aspects of this in [19], [21], [23], and [22] to some extent:
1- Software reliability figures can be used to evaluate software 
engineering technology...
2- A software reliability metric offers the possibility of evaluating 
status during the test phases of a project.
3- Software reliability can be used as a means for monitoring 
the operational performance of software and controlling changes to 
the software.
The comments of Shooman and Musa clarify the necessity to explore soft­
ware reliability measurement tools.
The difference between the hardware and software failure processes is very 
sharp. Musa [23] points out the difference between hardware and software 
failure processes:
The concept of software reliability differs from that of hardware 
reliability in that failure is not due to a wearing-out process. Once
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a software defect is properly fixed, it is in general fixed for all time. 
Failure usually occurs only when a program is exposed to an envi­
ronment that it was not designed or tested for. The large number 
of possible states of a program and its inputs make perfect com­
prehension of the program recpiirements and implementation and 
complete testing of the program generally impossible. Thus, soft­
ware reliability is essentially a measure of confidence we have in 
the design and its ability to function properly in all environments 
it is expected to be subjected to. In the life cycle of software there 
are generally one or more test phases during which reliability im­
proves as errors are identified and corrected, typically followed by a 
non-growth operational phase during which further corrections are 
not made (for practical and economical reasons) and reliability is 
constant.
Hardware reliability studies are mainly concerned with physical deteriora­
tion of hardware whereas software reliability studies concentrate on the design 
problems. We may even call the software reliability as design 7'eliability. One 
may think that design reliability concept can also be applied to hardware man­
ufacturing processes. But, ‘ because of the probability of failu7'e due to wear 
a,7i.d other physical causes has usually bee7i 7nuch greater than the probability of 
failu7’e due to an u7irecog7iized design problem hardware reliability models opt 
to ignore the impact of the design failure process on the overall reliability of 
hardware (Musa [22]).
Comparison of the failure rates of a typical hardware and software summa­
rizes what we talk about the differences between the hardware and software 
failure processes.
Graph of a typical failure rate function of a hardware is like a bathtub 
as seen in the Figure 1.2. In the early failure period (usually called infant- 
mortality or burn-in period), inoperable or incompatible parts of hardware 
may cause the system to fail. As they are replaced, the hardware is adapted 
to the environment and failure rate is decreased. In the normal operating
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Figure 1.2: Failure Rate of a Typical Hardware
period, the hardware is pretty resistant to the environment. Therefore, the 
failure rate is fairly constant. After a while, fatigues increase and hardware 
cannot compensate the physical stress of environment. Eventually, a wearing- 
out period follows the normal operating period, and, failures occur more often. 
Therefore, hardware becomes more and more unreliable.
Operational
Phase
Figure 1.3: Failure Rate of a Typical Software
On the other hand, failure rate of a typical software has a tendency to 
decrease. Figure 1.3 is an approximate sketch of failure rate function of a
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software. It should be mentioned that there is not a single shape for the failure 
rate function of a software on which the researchers agree and Figure 1.3 is 
illustrated for the sake of simplicity.
The points A, B, C, D and E are the times when a software failure occurs. 
At those points, the software failure rate changes because some faults in the 
software are fixed. It is customary to assume that the time needed to fix faults 
and remove them is negligible. Therefore, jumps occur at those points. Failure 
rate decreases and software reliability increases when the fault is successfully 
fixed and removed (points A, B, D, E). But, sometimes, as the fault is removed, 
debugging team may introduce new faults into the code which causes the failure 
rate to increase (point C). After the debugging phase is stopped and software 
is released to the market, no more fault is removed and failure rate does not 
change.
The other main difference between software and hardware failure process 
lies in the ability of the corresponding production systems to replicate a typical 
product. In hardware manufacturing systems, factors such as tool wearing, 
experience of labors working in different shifts, materials coming from different 
suppliei's, etc. make it difficult to produce products in a mass with a desired 
reliability. Therefore, various quality control activities are undertaken. On the 
other hand, the replication of a software is trivial and all replicated softwares 
have exactly the same characteristics including the reliability.
Despite the differences between the software and hardware failure processes, 
software reliability theory should be compatible with hardware reliability the­
ory. This is necessary because, practically, the main concern is the reliability 
of the whole computerized systems. Therefore, many concepts and notions of 
hardware reliability theory such as failure rate, mean time to failure (MTTF), 
etc. are also adapted to software reliability theory. By the same reason, the 
definition of software reliability is very similar to the hardware reliability: Soft­
ware reliability is defined by Musa [26] as the probability of failure-free executiov· 
of a computer program in a specified environment for a specified time.
In the remaining part of this chapter, we first review some important studies
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related to the software reliability theory in the past. Thereafter, we give a short 
outline of the remaining part of this study.
1.1 Literature Review
Software Reliability Modeling studies started in the late 60’s. But, research was 
accelerated in 70’s. In this section, we review some of the software reliability 
models more closely to give an idea about how the software reliability modeling 
practice is evolved^. Our main point in this study will be to find ways to 
benefit from the structural information of the software to get more accurate and 
robust estimates of its reliability. Therefore, we primarily divide the software 
reliability literature into two main parts: Models of black-box approach and 
models incorporating the logical structure of software. We present examples of 
those two classes in separate subsections.
1.1.1 Black-Box Models
Researchers using black-box approach mainly concentrate in the data collected 
on time between successive failures and number of faults in the program. They 
try to investigate which probability distribution represents the data best. Log­
ical structure of the program and physics of the programming environment 
have not been much considered in those models. Therefore, they are easy to 
understand and apply. Because the data requirements are small, application 
of black-box models is cheaper than their counterparts.
One of the earliest model in this class is Jelinski-Momnda Reliability Model. 
The main assumptions are
1- The rate (of detection of software errors [^ ]) is proportional
^The reader may first want to refer to Subsection 2.1.1 for the definitions of some funda­
mental concepts that are frequently used in this section.
'^Software error is used in the same meaning as a fault.
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at any time to the current error content in the software package. 
Between error detections, the rate is constant.
2- All remnant errors are equally likely to occur, and the time 
separations between the errors are statistically-independent.
3- Errors which are detected are instantly and perfectly cor­
rected without introducing any new errors...[18].
Failure rate of the software between two successive failures is constant. The 
inter-failure times are assumed to be exponentially distributed independent 
random variables. But, they are not identical because rate of inter-arrival times 
are assumed to change as faults in the software are fixed. Authors computed 
M TTF and reliability of software at any time.
All three assumptions of Jelinski-Moranda Model are heavily criticized. 
Goel and Okumoto [6] proposed that independence of inter-failure times is 
unrealistic. In their Model (Goel-Okumoto Model), they assumed that time 
between k-th and (k l)-st failures is dependent on the time to A;-th failure. 
Different from Jelinski-Moranda model, number of faults in the program before 
debugging is a random variable. They modeled the fault-counting process with 
a non-homogeneous Poisson process. They formulated various rate functions 
for this process and explored reliability function.
Later, some other software reliability models based on non-homogeneous 
Poisson process are developed by fitting various functions for the mean-value 
of the process [27], [40], [41].
In the mean time, Musa [19] proposed his Execution Time Model. In his 
paper, he claimed that Moranda’s assumptions are valid if the failure times are 
measured in terms of processor time, so called execution time. In particular, he 
reported that times between successive failures measured in terms of execution 
time are exponentially distributed. Unlike Jelinski-Moranda model, he treats 
the number of corrected errors in the software as a continuous random variable. 
His major contribution is introduction of execution time concept. Besides this, 
he developed a calendar time component of his model which actually projects
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the measures in terms of the execution time on the calendar time. By doing 
this, he combined the capacity problems resulting from the constraints on man­
power and available computational time with the software failure process in 
theory. Thus, resources can be used effectively and efficiently to improve the 
software up to a satisfactory level of reliability at a reasonable cost within a 
permissible time interval. Moreover, the software reliability activities can be 
measured in terms of monetary terms.
In his following paper, Musa [21] makes the foundations of his execution 
time model rigid. He published the statistical evidence for the typical assump­
tions which are also adopted by many other softwai'e reliability models. He 
claims that the statistical analyses indicate that
1- failure intervals are independent of each other,
2- the execution times between failures are piecewise exponen­
tially distributed,
3- the failure (hazard) rate is proportional to the expected num­
ber of remaining faults.
This paper together with [20] is invaluable for the software reliability studies 
because, even today, we do not have enough data on failure processes of real-life 
software projects.
Musa tested his Execution Time Model on various data sets, and issued 
some useful methodologies for software engineers to apply the model to real- 
life projects [23].
In the effect of Bayesian approach to the software failures, Musa [26] mod­
ified Execution Time Model into Logarithmic Poisson Execution Time Model. 
In his new model, he assumes that rate of inter-failure times is not a linear 
but an exponential function of number of remaining faults in the software. He 
shows that Logarithmic Poisson Execution Time model performs better than 
the Execution Time Model.
What makes Musa modify his model was Littlewood’s claim:
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...reductions in failure rate resulting from repair action following 
eaiiy failui'es are often greater because they tend to be the most 
frecpiently occurring ones, and this property has been incorporated 
in the model.
Littlewood is one of the pioneers in the software reliability theory who 
discussed most of the software modeling practice in his early papers. Here, I 
will go over four of those papers.
Littlewood ([12], [14], [16], [17]) concentrates on the main assumptions of 
existing models and performance measures used to quantify the reliability of a 
software. Almost all software reliability models assume that
A .l. failure rate of software at any time is proportional to the number 
of remaining (physical) faults and it is constant between successive 
times of fault-fixing,
A .2. every time a failure occurs the related faults are successfully fixed 
and removed for certain,
A.3. removal of every fault improves failure rate of software in the same 
amount,
A.4. Mean time between failures (MTBF) is widely used to measure how 
reliable a software is, and, to predict its reliability in the future.
Littlewood attacks those four main assumptions in his papers. But, what 
makes those papers original is the introduction of a conceptual model of soft­
ware failure process.
Littlewood emphasized the importance of proper definition of the problem 
we attempt to solve. If a problem is carelessly defined, our studies may end up 
with a right solution to the wrong problem.
What is our problem? We want to set up a metric and some tools to evaluate 
the reliability of a software in terms of users ’ specifications. We expect that 
those tools help us to understand what is going on and to take cost-effective
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actions to improve customer satisfaction. This fact needs to be emphasized 
because, as Musa stated in one of his papers, software developers and code 
writers are opt to fix all the faults in a code. They believe that a software 
product is unreliable as long as it contains undiscovered faults. Most of the 
reliability models implicitly adopted this point of view. Assumptions similar 
to A .l refers to this belief. But, a user does not care about how many faults 
there are in a software. If he never experienced any of those faults, he would 
appreciate the software as 100 per cent reliable. Furthermore, not all faults 
are experienced by a user with equal frequency. A pi'ogram with two faults 
agitated infrequently will be considered more reliable than another with only 
one fault agitated more often.
Littlewood distinguishes different assessment of software reliability by users 
and code developers by calling the first one as operational reliability. He puts 
the problem in its proper place: We should develop tools to evaluate operational 
reliability of a software.
In the mean time, he reveals the connection between operational reliability 
and total number of remaining faults in the code. But, he criticizes existing 
models because they oversimplify that connection by assuming that faihuvs rate 
is proportional to the number of remaining faults in the code.
In short, he blames those models because they solve the wrong problem.
Second issue Littlewood addresses is unconscious usage of MTBF for soft­
ware failures. He warns researchers when they draw analogies between hard­
ware reliability and software reliability. He emphasizes the fact that hardware 
decays due to aging. Therefore, it is natural to model the lifetime of the com­
ponents of a hardware system with a distribution having finite moments. On 
the other hand, software are not subject to environmental (physical) stress. 
Therefore, once a software is upgraded, it performs well at any time no matter 
how much time has passed since the last upgrade. Littlewood calls this prop­
erty of software product as reliability growth. Littlewood also argues that it is 
not exceptional to have completely fault-free software. He bases this conclu­
sion on widely used programming techniques such as top-down modular design:
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Programs are usually composed of relatively small modules and fixing all faults 
in them is practically possible. This may result in a fault-free software as a 
whole.
Thus, time-between-software-failures could have momentless probability 
disti’ibution. Therefore, MTBF can increase to infinity, and any estimate based 
on finite-valued samples of observed time-between-failures is meaningless.
Instead of using MTBF, Littlewood proposes to investigate distribution 
function of time-to-failure. Even, the quantiles of its distribution function is 
more informative than MTBF. Another side-effect of MTBF is that it does not 
give any idea about the variability of time-between-failures.
Author’s caution about reliability growth should invite us to be careful 
when we use renewal-theory-based techniques to attack the problem. Little- 
wood suggests that failures -renewals in some generalized meaning- should 
not occur after some finite period. Then, renewals are transient. Therefore, 
powerful tools coming from studies on persistent renewal processes are no more 
remedy. Especially, nice results about availability discovered for hardware case 
are helpless when we deal with software reliability.
Third issue Littlewood draws our attention to is the individual contribution 
of each fixed fault to the improvement of software reliability. It is not sensible 
that removal of every fault improves the failure rate in the same amount as 
many popular models assume. Some faults are frequently agitated than the 
others. Therefore, they cause certain failures to appear frequently. So, we may 
conclude that failures with high occurrence rate affect the reliability of the 
whole software system more adversely than the others. But, those failures with 
high occurrence rates are more likely to be fixed earlier than their counterparts. 
Therefore, we can conclude that fixing earlier failures improves the reliability of 
the software more than the later failures. That is, diminishing returns of fixing 
marginal failures -law- is in act. Here, Littlewood assumes that the debugging 
process is perfect for the sake of simplicity. But, he also takes into account the 
imperfect fault-fixing operations once he introduces his conceptual model.
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It is A.3 that Littlewood may have most elaborately worked out. This is 
one of the key item of his conceptual model. We will present his approach 
to this problem, together with the conceptual model he proposed later in the 
second chapter. As I mentioned earlier, his conceptual model is our starting 
point in this study.
Littlewood also warns the researchers about not to lose the main point 
in the software reliability modeling studies. He sketches the mission of the 
software reliability studies with a simple figure (see Figure 1.4). The point 
we should arrive is the well developed theory that explores the consequence of 
failures in monetary terms. He summarizes the past and the future of software 
reliability studies in four stages. So far, the first two stages are vigorously 
studied although, he thinks, there are many misleading conceptualisations of 
many notions. But, last two stages are still not explored thoroughly [16].
BUGS, ERRORS FAILURES FAILURES Consequence
in \ in program \ in \ of failures
program y execution y USE environment y LIFE CYCLE
in COSTS
TEST environment
Figure 1.4: Research Agenda in Software Reliability
One of the interesting model is constructed by Kremer [9]. Kremer models 
the software failure process with a birth and death p7vcess. A birth represents a 
fault spawned by the debugging team after an unsuccessful fault-fixing attempt. 
A death represents a successful fault-correction. It is also allowed that the 
fault-content of the software may not change after a fault-fixing attempt.
Before concluding the review of black-box models, I should reveal that 
a vast number of software reliability models are also developed by Bayesian 
School [3], [4], [10], [11], [34], [33], [35]. They are usually based on Time-Series 
Analysis Techniques, Kalman-Filtering, etc.
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1.1.2 Software Reliability Models Incorporating Logical 
Structure of the Software
Besides black-box modeling practice, there are some other approaches that 
make use of some inhei'ent characteristics of the software in order to measure 
its reliability accurately.
One of them is fault seeking. This is actually a very popular statistical 
method used by zoologists to estimate the size of wild animal populations. 
An example is the estimation of number of fish in a pond. As a first step, 
researchers catch a number of fish from the pond, mark each of them with a 
sign and leave them back to the pond. Next, they catch a sample of fish from 
the pond and count the marked fish in the sample. The basic assumption is 
that the fish population in the pond does not change during the time interval 
passed between marking the fish and taking the sample. Then, the number 
of marked fish in the sample has a Hypergeometric distribution. The only 
unknown parameter is the size of the fish population. By using maximum 
likelihood estimation technique, the size of fish population is estimated.
The same method is applied to the software. Some faults are spawned 
into the code of software on purpose by the programmers who have the similar 
background and experience as the code developers of the software have. During 
the debugging phase, the spawned and inherent faults which are fixed by the 
testing team are counted. Here, the spawned faults are analogies of marked 
fish in our example. Thus, the total number of inherent faults in the software 
is estimated by using maximum likelihood approach. This estimate is used 
to compute pointwise availability of the software. Some of well known fault­
seeking models are developed by Miller, Lipow and Basin [5], [31].
There are major criticisms addressed to the fault seeking method. First 
and the most important one is that it causes the limited man-power and com­
putational time to be wasted to fix the spawned faults. Second criticism is 
related to the representativeness of spawned faults for the inherent faults. The 
inherited faults are, usually, more difficult to be fixed than the spawned faults.
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Therefore, probability of detection of the spawned and inherent faults are not 
equal. This is contrary to the basic assumption behind the claim that the 
number of spawned faults fixed during the debugging phase has a Negative 
Binomial distribution.
Another modeling approach, Input-Domain based Modeling, makes use of 
the input space of a software to estimate the software reliability. The main 
idea underlying those models is to make inference about the behavior of the 
software in the future by observing its response to a sample of input states 
which is far smaller than the input space.
Nelson Model is one of the earliest Input Domain Based Models [5]. In 
this model, n input states are randomly selected from the input space and the 
software is exercised with each of those n inputs. Number of runs that result 
in an unsatisfactory output, say n^ ., is counted. Then the reliability of the 
software is computed as 1 — n,f,/n.
One of the draw-backs of Nelson Model is the assumption that every input 
state is randomly chosen. Researchers argue that the randomly chosen sample 
of input states may not be representative for the input space as a whole. Brown, 
Lipow and Ramamoorthy [29], develop new models to overcome this difficulty 
in the Nelson Model.
The last example for the modeling approaches which make use of inherent 
features of a software to model its reliability is Markovian models.
In 1975, Littlewood proposed his first Markovian Model [13]. In his paper, 
Littlewood assumes that the software is composed of many small subroutines. 
Subroutines are elementary sub-units which are designed to perform several 
stages of the function of the whole software. Because the tasks performed by 
a subroutine are usually simple, they are easy to develop and test.
In his model, Littlewood studies two different kinds of failures. First one is 
the failure of a subroutine. It occurs when a subroutine does not perform the 
task which it was designed for. Second type failure may occur during the switch
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between two subroutines. Switching failures occur especially when a subroutine 
passes an inappropriate parameter type or value to the next subroutine.
Littlewood assumes that every subroutine has its own continuous time fail­
ure process. The failure processes of different subroutines are independent 
from each other. In his paper, he particularly substitute a Poisson process for 
each failure process within every subroutine. The rates of Poisson processes 
for different subi'outines are allowed to be different.
Switches between successive subroutines are ruled by a continuous time 
Markov process. For every pair of subroutines he defines a Bernoulli process. 
The switch from one subroutine to the other may be successful with some 
constant probability between 0 and 1 which is uniquely determined by the 
calling and called subroutines, or, may cause the software to fail. He gives 
some asymptotic results on the reliability function of the software.
In his later paper [15], Littlewood extends his previous Markovian Model 
by modeling the switches between successive subroutines with a semi_Markov 
process.
In a recent study [38], Whittaker and Thomason assumed that the input 
states chosen by a user follows a Markov property and they studied the ways 
to design the best testing strategies.
In the next section, we shall mention about a new trend in the software 
reliability studies.
1.1.3 Unification of Existing Software Reliability Mod­
els
As it can be observed from the previous discussion there is a vast literature on 
software reliability models. Xie [39] overview only 100 of them in his review 
paper. However, there does not exist a unique model which beats others in 
every aspect.
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This creates an overwhelming problem for the practitioners. Engineers par­
ticipated in a softwax'e development project cannot decide on which reliability 
model best suits their software project in the plethora of models. Therefore, 
contemporary researchers in software reliability area start working on a new 
subject: Development of some performance measures for software reliability 
models and their unification into one general model.
One of the important studies in this area is published in 1984 by some of the 
leading researchers in the software reliability theory, lannino, Musa, Okumoto 
and Littlewood [7]. They manifest the major criteria which should be used in 
the evaluation of competing software reliability models. They stated that their 
mission is not to select the best model but to put basic principles that help the 
practitioners to reduce the number of candidates to be used in their projects.
They summarized their criteria under five categories, listed in the order of 
importance as predictive validity, capability, quality of assumptions, applicabil­
ity and simplicity.
Predictive validity is ’the capability of the model to predict future failure 
behavior during either test or the operational phases from present and past 
failure behavior in the respective phase.’
They did not define a criterion which help to decide on whether the pre­
dictive validity of a model is adequate or not, but made some preliminary 
discussions on possible measures.
The second most important criterion, capability, is defined as the ability of 
the model to estimate satisfactorily the quantities primarily used by software 
managers and engineers to monitor software development process. From those 
quantities that help the managers and engineers to achieve their technical and 
monetary missions, important ones are listed as
1- present reliability, MTTF, or failure rate.
2- expected date of reaching a specified reliability, MTTF, or 
failure rate goal (It is assumed that the goal is variable and that
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dates can be computed for a number of goals, if desired. If a date 
cannot be computed and the goal achievement can be described 
only in terms of additional execution time or failures experienced, 
this limited facility is preferable to no facility although it is very 
definitely inferior).
3- human and computer resource and cost requirements related 
to achievement of the foregoing goal(s).
Third criterion is quality of assumptions. The assumptions made in the 
model should be tested, if possible by using real data, otherwise by checking 
their consistency with the software engineering principles and experience. Ro­
bustness of the model in the case that the assumptions are not fully satisfied 
in a particular environment is considered as a factor that evenly increases the 
re.spect of the model.
Applicability is another criterion that is tested for the model:
A model should be judged on its degree of applicability across 
different software products (size, structure, function, etc.), different 
development environments and different life cycle phases...
There are at least five situations that are encountered commonly 
enough in practice that a model should either be capable of dealing 
with them directly or should be compatible with procedures that 
can deal with them. These are
1- phased integration of a program during test (i.e. testing starts 
before the entire program is integrated, with the result that some 
failure data is associated with a partial program,
2- design changes to the program,
3- classification of severity of failures into different categories,
4- ability to handle incomplete failure data or data with mea­
surement uncertainties (although not without loss of predictive va­
lidity),
5- operation of same program on computers of different perfor­
mance.
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Simplicity of the model is the last desired factor. The data requirements 
of the model should not be severe. The model should be conceptually easy 
to understand by the software managers and engineers. Finally, the model 
should be programmable on a computer and the program should run fast and 
inexpensively with no manual intervention after the initial input is entered.
On the other hand, Langberg and Singpurwalla tried to unify some software 
models by using Bayesian techniques [11].
In [l], Abdel-Ghaly et al. practiced some statistical tools to test the predic­
tion validity of some well-known models. But, they emphasized the difficulty 
of the problem and advise the practitioners that they should test a number of 
plausible software reliability models with their own data and decide themselves 
on which model best performs in their case.
1.1.4 Further Topics in Software Reliability Literature
There are a number of review papers that overview important software relia­
bility models in the literature. Readers who want to learn the details about 
those models can study Bittani [2], Musa [25], Ramamoorthy [29], Singpur­
walla [36] and Xie [39]. Especially, Musa [25] is known as one of the best books 
in Software Reliability and is used by the practitioners, whereas Ramamoorthy 
[29] reviews not only so called Time Domain Models but also Input-Domain 
Models.
There are some other studies that give insight about the dynamics of soft­
ware failure process. They will provide a good background for the readers who 
wish to study the software reliability models in a more detail. I give here two 
of them.
One is a paper representing the results of a study on some software error 
data [30]. In this paper, authors discuss their findings on the major sources of 
faults in a software. They also conducted some statistical tests to determine 
which characteristics of the software is more correlated with its fault-content.
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Another paper clarifies how an operational profile represents the environ­
ment of the software [24] (published in [28]). In the Subsection 1.1.1, we indi­
cated that one of the sources of stochastic nature of software reliability problem 
is the uncertainty in users’ input selection. Therefore, operational profile is one 
of the key issues in software reliability theory. In his paper, Musa explains to 
some extend how the operational profile of a software is constructed.
1.2 Scope and Outline of the Study
In this study, we propose a new software reliability model. Many of available 
models in the literature are of black-box approach. They usually overlook the 
inherent dynamics of software failure process. Some important information 
about the softwai'e that is already available before any serious reliability anal­
ysis such as number of instructions, number of unique instruction paths, etc. 
are not benefited by those models. The clues given by an operational profile 
are not appropriately used.
There are still some other modelling approaches such as Input Domain 
based Modeling and Markovian Modelling. But, they, typically assume that a 
program consists of small modules which are still considered as black-boxes.
Here, we look for a new software reliability model which represents the 
physics of the software failure phenomenon more accurately than the models 
proposed in the literature. Therefore, we search for a neat and thorough con­
ceptual model of software failure process. The only conceptual model in the 
literature to our knowledge was developed by Littlewood. We stick to it as 
much as possible and try to build a mathematical model of what Littlewood 
describes in his conceptual model.
We primarily aimed to develop a mathematical model of software failure 
process which sacrifices little from what really happens during software testing 
phase and makes the evolution of fault-screening operations and their effects 
on the reliability of software be well understood.
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Our study is mainly composed of three parts. In the first part, we con­
centrate on the mathematical representation of software and its features. We 
present the basic concepts in the Software Reliability Theory and Littlewood’s 
Conceptual Model in Chapter 2. We also sketched out our mathematical model 
of software reliability in the same chapter. In the next part, we studied the 
marginal contribution of fixing fault (s) upon a software failure to the software 
reliability. Lastly, we modeled the software reliability growth as successive fail­
ures occur one after the other. The results of those two parts of our study is 
presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 concludes this study by underlying future extensions to our soft­
ware reliability model.
Chapter 2
A  Conceptual Model of 
Software Failure Process and 
Preliminaries
In order to evaluate the reliability of a software accurately, we should under­
stand when and how the software failure occurs, how the software failure pro­
cess and the fault-fixing-and-removing process (i.e. debugging process) interact 
with each other, which factors affect the efficiency of the debugging process. 
Besides those, it is necessary to be familiar with the sources of uncertainties 
in the software failure process, the statistical dependencies among them. They 
will especially help us to make realistic assumptions, if we need to do so, when 
we begin to build a mathematical model that represents the dynamics of the 
software failure process, and, also to judge the mathematical model’s ability to 
represent the stochastic behavior of a software by our intuition that possibly 
inspires from the clues they give.
Therefore, we need a conceptual model which primarily concerns with the 
physics of the software failure process with the least possible emphasis put on 
the mathematical tractability. But, still, it should have such a logical frame
22
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that it can be gradually expanded to a mathematical model. Thus, the con­
ceptual model will always serve as a concrete basis for the abstractions that 
we make to come up with a mathematical model.
In Section 2.1, we present the Conceptual Model of software failure process 
proposed by Bev Littlewood in 1988 [17] after introducing definitions of basic 
notions that we frequently use in the remaining part of this study.
We start building the mathematical model of software reliability based on 
the Littlewood’s conceptual model. The basic motivations which have aroused 
after an invaluable discussion with Professor Erhan Çınlar in a conference^ on 
Littlewood’s Conceptual Model is presented in Section 2.1.
Although the basic framework for our study appears in Section 2.2, some 
practical problems are needed to be solved, and some new notions should be 
defined before continuing with the output of Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we 
improve the model we presented in Section 2.2 and complete the passage from 
the Littlewood’s conceptual model to a mathematical framework where the 
physics of the software failure process is completely characterized with (ran­
dom) variables and functions.
In Section 2.4, we illustrate how the basic notions and parameters that we 
defined in the earlier sections on a sample programming environment.
2.1 Preliminaries
The main objective of this section is to give the reader a background that may 
help him or her to follow the remaining part of the study.
'N A T O  ASl Conference on Current Issues and Challanges In the Reliability and Main­
tenance of Complex Systems, held in Antalya, Turkey in 199.5.
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2.1.1 Basic Concepts in the Software Reliability Theory
Below, we mainly give only the definitions of the fundamental notions. Some­
times, we state the general assumptions and present brief discussions. Further 
explanations of some notions will be supplied in the following sections where, 
we believe, they are helpful to understand the particular results or conclusions 
we arrived.
Definition 1 The reliability of a software is the probability o f  failure-free 
execution o f  a computer program in a specified envirvnment fo r  a specified time 
(M usa [26]).
Definition 2 A  computer program, or, a software, is a collection o f  com ­
puter instructions that are organized in a logical order to perform  specific tasks.
We assume that the size and the content of a program do not change with 
time when we deal with its reliability.
Definition 3 A  program run is a complete program execution during which 
exactly one specific task is accomplished.
Each time a program run is completed, we say that, the program run term i­
nates and the program searches for another task in its task queue ready to start 
a new run. Because we expect that the number of different tasks that can be 
performed by the program is finite, same program runs take place repetitively 
during the life cycle of the program. That is, we can denote the life cycle of 
the program as a sequence of finitely many, different runs.
Definition 4 The program runs devoted to the same task establish a run- 
type.
Thus every program run is a realization of a particular run-type.
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Definition 5 A n  input variable is any data item that is external to the 
program, and used by the program to proceed the specific tasks.
Definition 6 A n  input state is the collection o f  all input variables that are 
necessary fo r  a program to complete a full run.
An input state contains all necessary information for a program to accom­
plish a particular task assigned by the user.
Definition 7 The input space o f  a program is the collection o f  all possible 
input states o f  the program.
Definition 8 A n  operational profile o f a program is the frequency distribu­
tion o f  the input states o f  a program.
An operational profile is actually an empirical probability mass function 
that describes the usage rate of every input state. We expect that every typ­
ical software has a large number of users. It is not difficult to imagine that 
every user may have different tastes and objectives when using the software. 
Because the main objective behind the software reliability studies is to satisfy 
the expectations of the majority of the users, the operational profile is based 
on a field study that covers a large number of potential users of the software. 
Construction of an operational profile is actually a sophisticated problem on 
its own. When the software managers think that users’ expectations are not 
homogeneous they may come up with more than one operational profiles to 
model the behavior of different subclasses of users. It is also likely that the 
operational pi'ofiles change as time evolves. But, for simplicity, we assume that 
there is only one operational profile which does not change forever (In Defini­
tion 1, Musa uses the term environment in the same meaning as operational 
profile).
Definition 9 A n  output state is the response o f  a program run to the input 
state entered by the user.
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We study the output state of every program run to determine the software 
reliability.
Definition 10 A  software failure is a discrepancy between the output state 
o f a particular program run and the expectation o f  the user.
The first phase of the program development is understanding the expecta­
tions of the users from the software. A user usually does not have a concrete 
picture of what he really wants the software to do for himself. Sometimes, ex­
pectations of a user contradict with themselves. Therefore, software managers 
negotiate with the potential users of the software to come up with the simple 
and clear written statements of what they expect the software does, called soft- 
ware requirements. Thus, not the expectations of a user but what the software 
design team understands from them is embodied into the software. Therefore, 
misunderstanding of expectations of the potential users by the software design 
team may cause the software fails. But, the major reason of software failui’es 
is the logical errors, called faults, in the software code.
Definition 11 A  fault is a defective, missing or extra computer instruction  
or set o f  related computer instructions in the code o f  the program.
Thus, what causes a software to fail during a particular run are the inherent 
faults in the software source code. Understanding the difference between a 
software failure and a software fault is very crucial. Therefore, we advise the 
reader to go over Littlewood’s discussion we shortly summarized at page 11.
We expect that the software becomes reliable as the inherent faults are 
fixed and eliminated from the program code. There are many techniques such 
as code reading, fault-tree analysis to fix the faults. But, even though they 
may be effective, we are not able to quantify their contribution to the software 
reliability. Another difficulty actually arises from the scope of the fault-fixing- 
activity:
C H A P T E R  2. A  C O N C E P T U A L  M ODEL O F SO FT W AR E FAILURE PROCESS AN D  PRELIM INARIES 27
...a run type represents a transformation between an input state 
and an output state. Multiple input states may map to the same 
output state, but a given input state can have only one output state.
The input state uniquely determines the particular instructions that 
will be executed and the values of their operands. Thus, it estab­
lishes the path of control taken through the program. Whether 
a particular fault will cause a failure for a specific run-type is pre­
dictable in theory. However, the analysis required to determine this 
might be impractical to pursue...[25]
The most popular tool to fix and remove the software faults is debugging 
the software.
Definition 12 The debugging phase o f a software is a period in the software 
developm ent during which the operational profile o f the software is constructed, 
the software is tested with the input states generated according to the operational 
profile and all data relevant to the reliability measurement o f  the software is 
gathered as the software failures occur and corresponding faults are fixed and 
T'ernoved.
Note that, in a debugging phase, we concentrate on the software failures 
not on software faults. This is the crucial point in the software reliability 
assessment as Littlewood states (see page 11). The debuggers think that faults 
are not equally important in terms of software reliability. They concentrate 
on the faults particularly lying in the frequently used parts of the software 
code. They manage this by using the operational profile. Therefore, unlike 
the methods we mentioned above, debugging a software helps us to reach our 
reliability objective faster.
2.1.2 Littlewood’s Conceptual Model
As we mentioned when we review the literature in software reliability theory, 
we met one detailed study of a conceptual model.
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Littlewood [17] defines a program as a function whose domain is the input 
space of the program. He partitions the output space into two disjoint sets, 
as the collection of unacceptable output states, and its complement. This 
partition of the output space leads to a natural partition of the input space 
into two disjoint sets, as the collection of input states that are mapped by the 
program to an unacceptable output and the complement of this set. The input 
states selected by a user are represented with the elements of the input space 
selected randomly in a sequence by a random process.
.. .We shall take a program, p, to be a mapping. Here, /  is the 
input space, i.e. the totality of all possible inputs^], and O is the 
output space. The failure process is illustrated in Figure 2.1pj.
Figure 2.1: A Conceptual Model of the Software Failure Process
In Figure 2.1(a), we see there are certain inputs which the program 
p cannot exercise correctly. These comprise the subset Ip of all 
inputs I. In practice, a failure will be detected by a comparison 
between the output obtained by processing a particular input, and
^Littlewood uses input in the same meaning as input state. 
■*The figure is copied from his paper.
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the output which ought to have been produced according to the 
specification of the program. Detection of failure is, of course, a 
non-trivial task, but we shall not concern ourselves with this prob­
lem here.
Here O can be taken to be the set of all outputs which can be 
produced by the processing of all possible inputs represented by I. 
The subset of failure-prone inputs produces the subset Oy of failed 
outputs.
We can take the conceptual model a stage further by considering the 
underlying faults which reside in the program p. Figure 2.1(b). If 
we make the reasonable assumption that each failure can be said to 
have been caused by one (and only one) fault, we have a partitioning 
of Ip into subsets corresponding to the different faults.
When we successfully remove a fault, and so change the program 
p into a new program p (see Figure 2.1(c)), this has the effect of 
removing certain points of /  from ly . Thus, the members of the 
removed fault set now map into acceptable regions of O.
Operational use of a program may be thought as the selection of a 
trajectory of points in the space / .  Typically, many inputs will be 
made to fix the underlying fault and if this attempt is successful 
we have the situation shown in the transition from Figure 2.1(b) to 
Figure 2.1(c).
Execution of the program then restarts (most probably in a region 
outside ly , since ly  is typically very small), and the trajectory of 
successive inputs continues until the next failure when the fixing 
operation is repeated.
The result is a sequence of programs, p i,p 2 ,p3 , ...,Pn,...; a sequence 
of successively smaller sets I } . j j ,,íy ,.. .,ly , ... · ,  a sequence of out­
put sets 0 \ 0 ‘^ ,0 ^ ,...,0 ” ,...; and a sequence of subsets of failed 
outputs 0\p, O y ,  O y ,  ...Oy, ...Cleavly, the reliability growth is de­
termined by the sequence {ly}··· [17]
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Besides the selection of the input states, he explains another source of 
uncertainty in the software debugging process. The software reliability does 
not improve in the same amount each time a fault is fixed. The contribution 
of every fault-fixing-and-removing operation is determined by the size of the 
particular fault which is removed at that time. The size of the fault is simply 
the sum of the usage frequencies of all input states that may agitate the fault. 
It is expected that larger faults in size are more likely to be fixed earlier in the 
debugging phase than the smaller faults. That is, if it is given that a software 
failure occurs upon execution of a particular input state, it is more likely that 
the input state agitates the largest of the remaining faults in the software code. 
Therefore, the reliability of the software increases fast in the early times of the 
debugging phase. But, because the sequence of the input states exercised by 
the user is a stochastic process, we cannot assert that the sequence of the faults 
that are fixed in the debugging phase is in the order of decreasing size.
To summarize, there are two sources of uncertainties in the debugging phase 
of a software: The first kind of the uncertainty arises from the operational 
environment. That is, we cannot predict beforehand whether the next input 
state that will be chosen by the user agitates a fault in the software or not. 
The other source of uncertainty is related to the amount of the reliability 
improvement. In the case that a software failure occurs, we cannot know the 
size of the fault which will be fixed and removed.
Before concluding his discussion, Littlewood warns the reader that the Fig­
ure 2.1 may be misleading. He points out that there is little known about the 
topological properties of the input space, trajectories of successive input states 
selected by a user and the failure set Ip.
C H A P T E R  2. A C O N C E P T U A L  M ODEL OF SO FT W AR E FAILURE PROCESS AN D  PRELIM INARIES 31
2.2 A  Preliminary Mathematical Model for the 
Software Reliability
The ideas in the model presented below are developed during several discus­
sions with Professor Erhan Çınlar on the Littlewood’s Conceptual Model. We 
appreciate his valuable ideas and present a formalized version of those discus­
sions.
Consider a software which has M  input states and contains N  software 
faults where M  and N  are two positive integers. Let I  and B denote the input 
space and the collection of all faults in the software, respectively. Because I  
and B have finitely many elements, we can enumerate both sets. Let
We will use the index j  for an element of the input space I  and the index 
k for an element of B, throughout this and next sections, i.e. j  will denote an 
input state and k will denote a fault in the software.
A computer program consists of a number of computer instructions that 
are sequentially executed. The program can contain one or more sequences 
of instructions. The particular sequence of instructions to be executed by the 
computer at any time is completely determined by the input state selected by 
the user. We call every logical sequence of computer instructions that can be 
executed in a particular computer run as a path of instructions, or simply, a 
path.
Consider a particular fault in the software. A fault was one or more defective 
computer instructions. Therefore, this fault lies at a certain point in the code 
of the software. Then, there will be at least one path of computer instructions 
that contains those defective instructions, that is, the fault. Eventually, all 
those paths, once executed by the computer, agitate the fault and a software 
failure occurs. One step further in this chain, for every fault, there exists a
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set of input states which cause the computer to follow those particular paths 
passing through the place in the code where the fault lies. Eventually, the fault 
will cause a software failure only if one of those input states is selected by the 
user. We denote the set of all those input states related to the fault k by Ij., 
k =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  N,  and call it as a fault set. Then, fault k will be detected if is 
realized, that is, an input state in Ik is exercised by the computer.
The debugging team tries a very large number of input states during the 
debugging period. We assume that every collection of input states successively 
selected until the next software failure has a Markovian property, and, the 
first input state selected following a fault-fixing is independent from the whole 
history of previously selected input states. Thus, the history of all input states 
consists of independent Markov Chains of input states following each other. 
By this assumption, we only need to analyze the stochastic behavior of the 
software just after a fault is fixed until the next software failure occurs. We 
will call each of those periods as a debugging cycle.
Here, we give the mathematical details about z-th cycle of debugging phase, 
z =  0 , l , 2 , 3 , . . .
Let X q denote the initial input state of the cycle selected by the debugging 
team. Let X \, X l , . . .  denote the successive input states following the initial 
input state Xiy Suppose that { « i ,  « 2 , . . . ,  o;,·,. . . ,  « m } is the initial input state 
distribution such that P  { X q =  / }  =  Oij, 0 < (Xj < 1, j  =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  M, a.^  -|-a;2 -l- 
. . .  -f c\m =  1. We assume that for every j  Ç. 1, there exists a Markov Matrix 
P.y and allow every Markov Chain { X q,X\,XI,  . . . }  to have a different Markov 
transition matrix depending on the initial input state X q. More explicitly, the 
Markov Chain X^ =  X j, · · ·} ruled by the one-step-transition matrix 
P^ · on {X q =  j }, i  =  1 , 2 , . . . , M.  The different transition matrices help us to 
model different usage patterns. We later clarify this point by giving examples.
The z-th debugging cycle, z =  0,1, 2, . . . ,  characterized by the Markov Chain 
X* =  {X (j,X j,X | ,. . . } ,  stops when, for the first time, an X f ,  n =  0,1,2, . . . ,  
is selected from some /fc, k E B. In this case, a software failure occurs. We 
denote this last input state in the z-th debugging cycle by X^, z =  0,1, 2, . . .
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Now, define the function, F' : I  >—>■ p ( B ) , by F\j) =  {k  \ j  6 h., k G B } , j  G 
/ ,  where p (B) denotes the power set of B, or the collection of all subsets of the 
set B. Then, for every j  G I, F  (j) denotes the collection of all inherent faults 
of the software whose fault sets contains the input state j . In other words, 
F( j )  is the collection of all faults in the software which are agitated to cause a 
software failure when the input state j  is executed by the software.
We are, especially, interested in F'(Xg). Note that F  (Xg)  is a random 
function, a function of a random variable Xg,  and, shows the contribution of 
the z-th debugging cycle into the software reliability growth. By the definition 
of Xg, F' (Xs)  necessarily a non-empty subset of B,  the collection of all faults 
in the software. To keep track of the fault content of the software which changes 
as faults are fixed in every debugging cycle, we define F*, the collection of all 
remaining faults in the software before the Fth debugging cycle, z =  0,1,2, . . .  
Naturally, Fq =  B.
We assume that the debugging activity is perfect, that is, upon a softwai'e 
failure, the underlying fault is successfully fixed and removed without spawning 
new faults into the code of software. Therefore, after the i-th debugging cycle, 
the fault content of the software will be =  Fi\ F' (XI·)·
Lastly, we assign an execution time, g{j) ,  to every input state j  G / ,  in 
order to compute time-related quantities, such as time to next failure, expected 
time to the completion of the debugging phase. The form of the function g 
can be determined by searching in the software engineering literature. Then, 
we can immediately compute the total time spent in z-th debugging cycle by
G (x ‘ ) =  a(xi) +  a(A';) +  --- +  g(xi).
We will give an algorithmic summary to show how the mathematical model 
works. But, before doing this, we briefly give an alternative definition for the 
debugging cycle which represents the behavior of a user more accurately.
We still assume that the debugging period is partitioned into successive
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debugging cycles. But, a debugging cycle may be allowed to stop before a soft­
ware failure occurs. Sometimes, the debugging team may believe that continu­
ing with a particular sequence of input states would not improve the software 
reliability and decide to start with a new cycle before a software failure occurs. 
Similarly, continuing with a particular sequence of input states may not repre­
sent a sensible potential usage pattern. Thus, some other stopping conditions 
additional to occurrence of a software failure could be generated. We may, for 
example, assign a random length to the debugging cycle and we may decide to 
stop the cycle when a software failure occurs or the number of input states the 
debugging team tried reaches to the predetermined length, whichever occurs 
first. In this case, all we assumed beforehand about a debugging cycle will 
still be valid except the definition of Xg.  Now, Xg  is mei'ely the last input 
state of the f-th debugging cycle. This means that F  (Xg)  is not necessarily a 
non-empty subset of B. Eventually, it is possible to have Fi =  Ti+i for some 
v; =  o , i , 2 , 3 , . . .
Now, we will show how the model repi'esents a debugging phase.
1. Let * =  0 and i'o =  B.
2. Choose the initial input state of the ¿-th debugging cycle, X q, from the 
input space 1 according to the probability mass function {a.j : j  G / } .
3. Use the Markov Matrix to get Xl^X^, . . . ,  Xg.
4. heiF i.n  =  F i \ F ( X i )
5. If the software reliability objective is not satisfied, increment i by one, 
and, go to step 2, else, stop the debugging phase and release the software 
to the market.
In the discussion, we did not formulate a stopping condition for the de­
bugging phase. We add the step 5 only to indicate that the algorithm should 
somehow stop.
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We, also, sketched out the geometric equivalence of the model (see Figure 
2.2). We represent the input space /  by the unit square, in the two dimensional 
Euclidean space. We assume that every point in [0,1] x [0,1] represents a single 
input state (thus, we relaxed the assumption that there are only finitely many 
input states). For every fault in the code of the software, we pick a point 
in the unit square according to a Poisson distribution and choose a radius 
for each point from a continuous distribution (we assumed that the radii of 
different points are i.i.d. distributed), then draw a circle whose center is the 
point we chose according to the Poisson process. Every circle we draw for a 
fault represents the fault set, that is, every point within the circle corresponds 
to an input state which agitate the fault assigned to the circle. Note that the 
circles may intersect with each other. In this case, a point lying in a nonempty 
intersection of two or more circles is supposed to agitate all of those faults once 
it is executed.
Figure 2.2; Realisation of the i-th Debugging Cycle
sFigure 2.2, shows a sample figure of the ¿-th debugging cycle. Because X  
falls in one of the circles, we suppose that a z-th debugging cycle stops with 
a software failure. Thus, at the end of ¿-the debugging cycle, the fault k is 
removed. The picture of the input space and the fault sets before the {i +  l)-st 
debugging cycle starts will look as in the Figure 2.3.
Finally, we assume that the stochastic process {{Fi, (^*)) · * ^ ■^}
completely models the software debugging phase.
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Figure 2.3: The Fault Sets after the i-th Debugging Cycle
2.3 An Alternative Approach to Model the Soft­
ware Reliability
In the previous section, we suppose that every debugging cycle represents a 
usage pattern. By a usage pattern, we mean a particular sequence of finitely 
many input states selected intentionally by a user to make the computer per­
form a number of tasks for the user. Therefore, we expect that the input states 
selected sequentially by the user, somehow, follow a logical pattern. But, be­
cause we cannot predict beforehand what the user intends to do, the selection 
pattern of the user is actually a stochastic process. We decide to model a 
debugging cycle, eventually a usage pattern, with a Markov Chain. We may 
justify our assumption by the following reasoning:
A user usually wants a software to create, analyze, or investigate something 
for himself. He tells the software what to do by simply entering some input 
states to the computer by means of input devices. Actually, what the user does 
is choosing specific paths of computer instructions embedded in the software by 
means of the input states even if he does not know anything about the computer 
programming. Therefore, selection of the instruction paths in a sequence that 
are necessary to be executed by the computer to complete some tasks for the 
user is instructed to the computer simply by entering the input states. It is
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sensible to assume that the sequence of instruction paths implicitly selected by 
the user is ruled by a Markov Chain. Usually, a user decides what to do next 
based on his conclusion he drew from the output created by the software in 
response to his last input state or states.
In the previous section, we assumed that every initial input state of a 
debugging cycle characterizes a particular usage pattern. It, eventually, leads 
to the assumption that every debugging cycle may have a different Markov 
Matrix, completely determined by the initial input state, because the Markov 
Matrix fully represents a usage pattern. Thus, for every input state, there 
corresponds a possibly different Markov Matrix. Therefore, we should analyze 
as many different Markov Chains as the number of input states the software 
has. But, this invites a difficulty: In a real life software project, a program 
may have enormous number of possible input states. Therefore, the cost of 
parameter estimations and computations may suddenly increase.
We overcome this difficulty by a slight modification of the model presented 
in the previous section.
We first state one of our observation: There can be many different input 
states which actually make the computer execute the same instruction path. 
Therefore, two different input states do not necessarily characterize two differ­
ent usage pattern. Indeed, there can be two debugging cycles, such that the 
input states in one cycle is completely different from those in the other cycle, 
but still, both cycles can contain exactly the same instruction paths following 
in the same order. Therefore, those two cycles actually represent the same 
usage pattern (i.e. both cycles perform exactly the same tasks in the same 
order) although the input states appearing in the cycles are different. We can 
overcome this ambiguity by a fine-tuning in the definition of a usage pattern 
and the model.
A usage pattern should be defined in terms of the available tasks that the 
software can perform. For every task, we can identify a path of computer 
instructions within the software code. Therefore, we suppose that the usage 
pattern is actually a representation of the sequence of tasks selected by the user
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to be done by the software. Thus, not the initial input state of a cycle, but the 
initial instruction path which is to be executed by the computer in response 
to the initial input state, will characterize the usage pattern. Similarly, due to 
the same ambiguity resulting from the many-to-one relationship between the 
input states and the instruction paths, it is more logical to assume that, not 
the sequence of the particular input states the user selected, but the sequence 
of the instruction paths implicitly selected by the user (that is, the sequence of 
the tasks that the user wants the computer to perform) forms a Markov Chain.
Figure 2.4: Partition of Input Space into Path Sets
Now, we formulate the modified model. Every input state executes exactly 
one path of computer instructions embedded in the code of software. There­
fore, we can identify all instruction paths in the software, and partition the 
input space into disjoint subsets each assigned to a unique instruction path 
(see Figure 2.4). Suppose that there are L & Af different instruction paths 
embedded in the code of software. Because L is a finite positive integer, we 
can enumerate all the instruction paths as 1, 2 , L.  Throughout this 
section, we will use the index I to represent an instruction path. For every 
I =  1, 2, . . .  , L, we define pi =  { j  E I  : j  executes the instruction path /}  and 
call Pi as a path set. Then, a path set is the collection of all input states that 
execute the corresponding instruction path.
By the reasoning above, the collection of all path sets, is a partition of
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the input space / .  That is, ^  =  {pi,p2, · · · ,Pz, · · ■ ,Pl}, and, pzflPm =  0, for 
every Z, 77i =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  L, and Z ^  m, and, I  =  U;^i Pi·
We suppose that i-th debugging cycle, i =  0 ,1,2, . . . ,  is represented by 
P* =  . . . ) ,  where "P* is the n-th path set of Z-th debugging cycle,
implicitly selected by the debugging team, n =  0,1, 2, . . .  We assume that P® is 
a Mai’kov Chain. Let {7ri,7r2,. . . ,  tt;, . . . ,  ttl} be the initial state distribution of 
V\ i.e. P {P ^  =  Pi} =  7T;, 0 < 7Ti <  1, Z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  L, and, 7Ti+7r2+· · •+7T/, =  1. 
To every Z, Z =  1, 2 , . . . ,  L, we assign a Markov Matrix P/, and, assume that the 
Markov Chain P* =  (P o ,P î,P 2 ; · · ·) is ruled by the one-step-transition matrix 
Pi on {P,*, =  Pi).
We assign to every instruction path, Z, an execution time g (1), I — 1, 2, . . .  , L. 
Thus, we assume that every input state j  G pi has the same execution time 
which equals to g (1), I =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  L.
We suppose that there are M  faults in the code of software. We define 
a fault and its fault set in the same way as we did in the previous section. 
We briefly give other details analogous to the model presented in the previous 
section.
We suppose that Z-th debugging cycle, Z =  0,1,2, . . . ,  stops when the 
software fails during the execution of the instruction path P* for some n — 
0 ,1 ,2 , . . .  or a predetermined stopping condition holds, whichever occurs first. 
We denote the last instruction path executed in the Z-th debugging cycle by 
Py. The faults fixed at the end of the Z-th debugging cycle cannot be predicted 
beforehand even if we conditioned on Vg because we do not keep the informa­
tion of the exact input state in the ¿"-th sequence in the cycle. We determine 
whether a software failure occurs or not during the execution of the instruction 
path pi, by choosing randomly an input state j  from p;, and checking whether 
F{ j )  is a nonempty subset of B  or not.
At this point, we leave other details of the model to the remaining part of 
this study. We will gradually complete the model by investigating every com­
ponent of the model to a larger extend. Our main purpose in this section is not
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to give the complete model, but, provide to the reader some background about 
the basic notions such as path sets, fault sets which are later used extensively 
and fundamental assumptions.
We conclude this section by giving an algorithmic overview of the model 
some steps of which are formulated mathematically in the later chapter and 
some other are slightly modified.
Figure 2.5; Step 2 and 3: Path Sets and Fault Sets (L =  4, M =  4)
1. Examine the program structure. Identify all instruction paths in the 
code of the software. Find the input space. Partition the input space 
into disjoint path sets. Find the size of the input space and each path 
set.
2. Suppose that the unit square, [0,1] X [0,1] represents the input space. 
Partition the unit square into L rectangles whose areas are proportional 
to the cardinality of path sets. Thus, rectangles represent the path sets.
3. Take M  points in the unit square [0,1] x [0,1], according to a Poisson 
distribution. To every point, assign a radius, say ?·, which is generated 
from a continuous distribution. Assume the radii assigned to different
'Later, .some computational difficulties led us to represent the input space by the line 
segment [—1,1] on the (one-dimensional) real line. But, all steps, here, apply in the same 
way. Note that a circle on the real line with the center a € TZ and radius r G 'R- is simply 
the line segment [a — r, a +  r].
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points are i.i.d. random variables. Draw M  circles with centers as those 
points generated by the Poisson distribution and radii assigned to those 
points. Every circle represents a fault set (See Figure 2.5).
4. Initialize The Length o f Debugging Phase and Total Number o f 
Failures to zero.
5. Initialize z, the index of the debugging cycle, and, n, index of the instruc­
tion path of ¿-th cycle to zero
6. If the reliability objective is met stop, otherwise, choose the initial path 
set of the ¿-th cycle, Vq, from ^  =  { p i , p2, · · · , Pi, · · · , Pl } by the proba­
bility mass function { tti, 7T2, . . . ,  tt^ , . . . ,  TTi}. Suppose =  p^ ,^, for some 
/o =  1 ,2 , . . . , L .
7. Pick randomly a point in p/^ .^ This is an input state which actually 
executes the instruction path In- The execution time of this particular 
input state equals to g {In)· Increase Length o f Debugging Phase by
(j{L)·
Figure 2.6: i-th Debugging Cycle Stops with a Software Failure
8. If the point we selected in Step 7 falls into one of the fault sets (i.e. circles) 
that we constructed in Step 3, a software failure occurs (see Figure 2.6), 
and all the underlying faults are successfully fixed and removed. Thus, 
erase all the circles that cover the point (see Figure 2.7). Increment Total
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Number o f Failures and i, index of the debugging cycle by one. Go to 
Step 6.
Figure 2.7; The Fault is Removed before the (i+ l)st Debugging Cycle Starts
9. If the point we selected in Step 7 does not fall into any fault (i.e. cir­
cles), increment n, index of the instruction path of ?!-th cycle by one. 
Choose another path set from ^  =  {pi, p2 > · · · , Po · · ·, Pz,} by using 
the Markov Matrix P;q. Go to Step 7.
Our main objective when we start this section was to modify the preliminary 
model we presented in section 2.2 so that the potential costs of data processing 
are reduced. We accomplished this task: The modified model is based on 
the collection of the distinct paths of computer instructions embedded in the 
software code rather than the collection of all input states. Indeed, number of 
different instruction paths is much smaller than the size of the input space of 
a typical software. But, in the mean time, we think, we built a more accurate 
model of the debugging phase of a software development activity.
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2.4 Illustration of the Key Concepts in the 
Model on a Sample Software
In this section, our aim is to illustrate on a sample program how the key- 
concepts of our model such as input space, partition of input space into path 
sets, size of a path set, software failures, fault sets, size of a fault set, etc. are 
materialized.
We, also, give some evidence that confirm the necessity of different prob­
ability transition functions between successive computer instruction paths fed 
to software depending on the initial instruction path.
In this section, we represent the input space with the line segment [—1,1]. 
The necessity for this modification to our model will be clear in the next 
chapter. Eventually, the path sets, the disjoint subsets of the input space 
and the fault sets will also be represented by the line segments in the interval 
[—1,1]. All the claims that we made in the previous sections are still valid.
A simple enough computer program is selected to save space. Sample pro­
gram is written in Turbo Pascal for personal computers. It is included in [8] 
to illustrate some abstract data types in Pascal language. Some parts of the 
program were missing and assigned to the reader of the book as exercise. We 
completed some necessary parts to let program work properly. Some other 
missing parts are left untouched to exemplify software failures. But, we assure 
the reader that those faults in the program due to missing instructions are 
potential sources of failures in a real project.
Before passing to the next section, we should explain to reader who is not 
familiar to Turbo Pascal what a unit is. Unit is a separate program module 
which can be compiled to disk and then used by other units or programs. 
Procedures that are likely to be used by more than one program are collected 
into units. Any program can access those procedures in a unit only by declaring 
the name of unit, i.e. programmer does not need to duplicate source codes. 
Units are simply libraries of procedures.
C H A P T E R  2. A C O N C E P T U A L  M ODEL OF SO FTW AR E FAILURE PROCESS AN D  PRELIM INARIES 44
2.4.1 Overview of the Sample Program
Program is designed to process reservation requests of passengers in an airport: 
Passengers waiting to see an airline ticket agent are put in a queue. Passengers 
waiting in the queue are served according to FIFO rule. Whenever a ticket 
agent is available, the passenger waiting at the front of the ciueue will be 
served.
Specifications of the Program
Program is menu-driven. It maintains a queue of passengers waiting to see a 
ticket agent. The program user should be able to insert a new passenger at the 
rear of the queue, display the passenger at the front of the queue, and remove 
the passenger at the front of the queue. Just before the program terminates, 
it should display the number of passengers left in the queue.
Program Structure
Understanding program structure is important to develop our reliability model. 
Overview of the program structure helps us to identify instruction paths within 
the program. Debugging each instruction path contributes to the reliability of 
software in different amounts.
Source code of the program is already developed. Figure 2.8 illustrates its 
flow chart. Now, we overview the program structure. Identifying path sets is 
left to the following sections.
Program is split into four modules:
1. UseQueue.Pas 
Main program.
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It initializes the queue, displays a menu, allows user to select an opera­
tion.
Available functions:
• I(nsert a new passenger to the rear of the queue)
• R(emove the passenger at the front of the queue)
• D(isplay information about the passenger at the front of the cjueue)
• Q(uit the program)
2. PassengerADT.tpu 
unit.
This unit supplies procedures ModifyQueue, ReadPass, ClassConvert, 
WritePass.
ModifyQueue. This procedure interprets the operation request of the user 
and calls necessary procedures.
ReadPass. If the user selects operation I(nsert) from the menu prompted 
by the main program, procedure ModifyQueue calls this procedure. It 
prompts user to enter
• Passenger Name
• Class of Passenger
• Number of Seats requested
Available class types are
• F(irst Class)
• B ( usiness)
• E(conomy)
• S(tand-By)
• U(ndesignated)
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Once the user specifies class type of the passenger, function ClassConvert 
is called to convert the input to a class-type. Function ClassType is de­
clared within the procedure ReadPass.
WritePass. This procedure, simply, displays information kept for each 
passenger (passenger name, class type and number of seat requested) on 
the screen.
3. EnterData.tpu 
unit.
This unit supplies procedure Enterint to the procedure ReadPass.
Enterint checks whether user entered a number between 1 and 30 in 
response to number of seats. If the input is out of the range, it prompts 
user to enter a valid number and waits for a new input.
4. QueueADT.tpu 
unit.
This unit supplies procedures Insert, Remove, Retrieve, SizeOfQueue. 
Procedures Insert and Remove maintain passengers information.
Insert adds new passenger information to the rear of the queue. Remove 
deletes the passenger information at the front of the queue.
R etrieve copies information of the passenger at the front of the cpieue 
without deleting it from the queue.
2.4.2 Sample Runs of the Program
c: \user\savas\tez\sample\queue>usequeue. exe
Enter I(nsert), R(emove), D(isplay), or Q(uit)> I
Enter passenger data.
Passenger name > Savas Dayanik
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INPUT
Figure 2.8: Flow Chart of the Program 
Class (F, B, E, S)> E
Number of Seats - Enter an integer between 1 and 30> 2 
Enter I(nsert), R(emove), D(isplay), or C)(uit)> D 
Passenger at head of queue follows.
Name: Savas Dayanik 
Class: Economy 
Seat: 2
Enter I(nsert), R(emove), D(isplay), or Q(uit)> R
C IIA P l’ER 2. A C O N C E P T U A L M ODEL OP’ SO FTW AR E P'AILURE PROCESS AN D  PRELIM INARIES 48
Passenger removed from queue follows.
Name: Savas Dayanik 
Class: Economy
Seat: 2
Enter I(nsert), R(emove), D(isplay), or Q(uit)> Q 
Leaving passenger queue.
Number of passengers in the queue is 0 
c:\user\savas\tez\sample\queue>
2.4.3 Preliminaries for Reliability Model Construction 
of the Scimple Program
Our reliability model relies on determination of input space, probabilistic struc­
ture of selection of successive inputs, number of faults and size of fault sets.
In this section, we clarify how they are materialized.
Input Space of the Program
Input space is the collection of all possible input states that a user, probably, 
feeds the program with. Remember the definition of an input state: Infor­
mation supplied by the user to the computer necessary for the software to 
complete exactly one run-cycle.
In our sample program, a run-cycle starts at the node where the user spec­
ifies an action [/, /2, D, Q] and ends until program asks user for another action 
or it terminates (see Figure 2.8).
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Thus, all possible input states to the program can be listed as
(I, Passenger name, F, Number of Seat),
(I, Passenger name, B, Number of Seat),
(I, Passenger name, E, Number of Seat),
(I, Passenger name, S, Number of Seat),
(I, Passenger name. Class, Number of Seat) where
Class G {A ,.. ,Z } \ {F,B,E,S} U { 1 ,2 , . . . ,  50}, 
Number of Seat G {1,2,. . . ,50} U {A ,...,Z} 
Passenger name can take any value.
(R)
(D)
(Q)
(A),A€{A,...,Z}\{I,R,D,Q}
Note that we considered the possibility that a user may enter a character 
instead of a number in response to Number o f Seat prompt. This was the 
case when I ran the program; I, several times, entered a character carelessly. 
Mainly, because prompts for Class type and Number o f Seat follows in a 
secpience and menu is visually not well designed, this confusion is likely to 
happen. The same reason applies to selection of range for Class type entries.
I assumed that number of seats requested can take a value as large as 50. 
Passenger Name can take any value, but they have no practical value in terms 
of software reliability: No computations are made by using Passenger Name, 
that is, selection of a particular name does not cause the program to fail.
Above, each expression within brackets is considered a single input state 
to the program. Thus, an input state is allowed to be a combination of user’s 
entries to various data requests of the program within a single run-cycle.
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Partition of Input Space into Path Sets and Their Sizes
Before applying our model we need to determine the partition of the input 
space. A (instruction) path set is a subset of input space whose elements 
execute the same set of program instructions. Each line in the Table 2.1 cor­
responds to a different path set. Inputs specified in each row of the table 
executes the same set of instruction in the program (check with Figure 2.8). 
Second column of the Table 2.1 lists name of each path set. Third column 
shows how many input states each path set contains, and, last column shows 
size of each path set. The actual size of a partition is simply number of its 
elements (i.e. inputs). In our model, we represent the input space by the 
line segment [—1,1], and, each path set by small line segments whose length 
is proportional to its actual size. From size of path set we understand length 
of the its corresponding line-segment. Size of the path set pi, for example, is 
computed by (24/413) · 2 =  0.116.
Possible Path Number Size of
Instruction Path Sets Set of Inputs Path Set
{A,. Pi 24 0.116
R P2 1 0.005
D P3 1 0.005
QT
P4 1 0.005
I
5.1 (I, Passenger name, F, Number of Seat) 
5.1.1 Number of Seat =  1, 2 , 5 0 P511 50 0.242
5.1.2 Number of Seat =  A , Z P512 28 0.135
5.2 (I, Passenger name, B, Number of Seat) 
5.2.1 Number of Seat =  1, 2 , 5 0 Pr>21 50 0.242
5.2.2 Number of Seat =  A , Z P522 28 0.135
5.3 (I, Passenger name, E, Number of Seat) 
5.3.1 Number of Seat == 1, 2 , 5 0 P531 50 0.242
5.3.2 Number of Seat — A , Z P532 28 0.135
5.4 (I, Passenger name, S, Number of Seat) 
5.4.1 Number of Seat =  1, 2, ...,50 P541 50 0.242
5.4.2 Number of Seat =  A , Z P542 28 0.135
5.5 (I, Passenger name. Class, Number of Seat) 
Class e |{A,...,Z} \ {F,B,E,S}] U { 1 , 2 , 5 0 } P55 74 0.358
TOTAL 413 2.000
Table 2.1: The Path Sets of the Program
When we present the outline of our model in the previous section, we did 
not clarify how we should arrange the path sets in the input space. Actually, we 
do not know how to this until the next chapter. One reason why we decide not 
to model the input space by the unit square in the two dimensional Euclidean 
space is the difficulty to place the path sets in the unit square in a well-defined
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manner. But, the ease of playing with the line segments in the one dimensional 
space together with some important computational results help us to overcome 
this difficulty in this case. We postpone partitioning the input space (i.e. 
[—1,1]) until the next chapter where we give some facts about the input states, 
elements of the input space.
Program Failures
Here, we listed some undesirable output states (failures) of the program that 
we experienced. We do not intend to analyze their occurrence rate, time to 
appear and other quantities which we should be interested in terms of the 
software reliability. We only want to give some examples of software failures. 
We listed failures under the title of related feature imbedded in the software.
Menu
M .l Choice entered in lower case is not accepted
M.2 Entering a character that is not listed in the menu causes the program 
to stop if the queue is empty
Entering data for new Passenger
E.l User is not allowed to enter more than 30 for Number o f Seat (Remem­
ber that we assumed that number of seat should be able to take a number 
as large as 50)
E.2 When we enter unintentionally a character in stead of a number for 
Number o f Seat, program crashes.
E.3 Queue size may be small (Program can keep information of, at most, 100 
passenger)
E.4 If the queue is full, upon entrance of the next passenger information, 
program gives a message and stops.
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E.5 For an unintentionally entered wrong class type, program does not give 
another chance.
E.6 Any class type information other than Economy is not recognized although 
program does not give an error/warning message. This error can only be 
realized when a D(isplay) action is requested by user.
Remove function
R .l If the queue is empty just before a R(emove) request is demanded, pro­
gram gives a message and stops.
R.2 If a customer wants to cancel his/her seat-request (cancelling reserva­
tion), and, his/her request is not at the front of the queue, user cannot 
delete his/her entry.
Display Action
D.l If the queue is empty just before a D(isplay) request is submitted, pro­
gram gives a message and stops.
D.2 Program displays only the information of the passenger at the front of 
the queue, and, we do not have an editing-facility.
Failures and Fault Sets
Firstly, I should remind difference between a failure and a fault.
A software failure is the discrepancy between the output of the software 
and user’s expectation.
A fault is usually a physical or logical error in the source code of a software. 
Most common physical errors are syntax errors, initialization errors, etc. [30]. 
A logical error may not contain a physical error. Logical errors usually happen
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when the source code does not perform what really the programmer believes 
the code will do because of misuse of basic programming commands. Division 
by zero is an example to a logical error.
Software failures are mostly due to faults. But, sometimes, software failures 
occur although no faults are responsible for it: If the specification of a program 
does not match with user’s expectation, then software will fail to fulfill user’s 
expectation. In our example, program does not have a facility to edit passenger 
data.
These failures are due to design errors, and can only be overcome by un­
derstanding user’s expectation. Our x’eliability model does not handle design 
errors.
On the other hand, we cannot say that every fault in a software will cause 
a failure during the life-cycle of a software. There may be some faults which 
will never be experienced by users.
Thus, we assume that for every software failure, a fault is responsible for it. 
Because every fault, either physical or logical, lies in an instruction path, there 
may be some particular input states within that particular path set which trig­
ger the fault, eventually, software failure occurs. Collection of those particular 
input states is called a fault set.
Table 2.2 illustrates what a fault set and its size mean. Here, size of a 
fault set is simply number of its elements. Note that fault sets need not to be 
disjoint. In this table, we did not specify faults themselves. Fixing faults is the 
duty of testing team and its procedure is well defined. We are only interested 
in the role of input states in the scenario where faults cause failures.
Failures which occur depending upon realization of a random event are 
called random. Not all the time, the same input state may cause program to 
fail. Only when some conditions are satisfied, the input state triggers a failure, 
otherwise, program may run without any error. In the following table, we also 
indicate some random failures.
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Our model is not able to handle those random failures.
Failure Fault-Set Size Explanation
M.2 B M2 =  Pi 24 Random. Failure occurs if
E ..1 BEi  .,3 1 ...5 0 )} 80
the queue is empty
E.2 BE2 =  p512 U . . . U p542 1 1 2
E.4 BE.\ =  p511 U p521 U p5 3 i U p5.11 2 0 0 Random. Failure occurs if
E.5 BE^ =  p55 74
the queue is full
E.G BEq =  p511 U p5i2 U p53i U P5 3 2 308
R.l
Up54i U p542 U p55 
Bill -  P2 1 Random. Failure occurs if
R.2
D.l BDi =  P3 1
the queue is empty 
Design Error
Random. Failure occurs if
D .2
the queue is empty 
Design Error
Table 2.2: Examples for Fault Sets of the Pi’ogram
Initial State Distribution
Remember that, in our model, we keep track of each path set. Each time user 
experiences an input state, we noted the path (eventually path set) which will 
be executed by the input state. Our model simply evaluates changes in software 
reliability as successive instruction paths are executed by the user. Thus, union 
of all path sets is our state space. Therefore, it is crucial to compute initial 
state distribution, i.e. probability distribution of selection a path set. Here, 
we try to understand why frequency of selection of a particular path set may 
differ.
Suppose we start with a new computer session.
Selecting option ( /,· ,· ,· )  and /{(emove) may be more likely than ZJ>(isplay) 
and Q(uit):
• New customers may arrive to the desk to make reservation
• A new flight may be scheduled. Passenger in reservation queue may 
be assigned to this new flight.
• <5(uit) is unlikely: Clerk does not quit program immediately.
Usage frequencies for input states
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( / , - , 5 , 1 ) ,  · · · , ( / , - , 5 , 5 0 ) ,
( / , v S ; i ) , . . . , ( A - , . S , 5 0 )  
will be determined by the stochastic nature of
• arrival rate of type F, B, E, S passengers. Business type passenger- 
may fly more often than others. Therefore, their arrival rate may 
be higher.
• Number of Seat requirements. This may be dependent on the class 
type of passengers. Business type passengers may, usually, fly alone 
or with their secretary (i.e. if class type is B, then number of seat 
may, usually, take values 1 or 2)
One-step Transition Probabilities
We propose in our model that once a computer session starts, successive states 
(path sets) executed by the program follows a Markov Chain with different 
transition probabilities depending on the initial state (initial path set). In this 
section, we discuss whether this approach is applicable to our sample program 
or not.
1. Suppose that initial state is (/,·,■,■). We may suppose that the flights’ 
schedules are well determined. Then, reservation requests may follow one 
after another without intervention of a /¿(emove) request.
On the other hand, operator may want to check that data for new reser­
vation upon entering them to the computer. For this purpose, he may 
choose /9(isplay) action. Thus, we may expect that, starting the ses­
sion with an input state like (i, ·,·,·), another {1, ■,■,■) or /.)(isplay) in­
put state is more likely to be fed up to the computer than a /¿(emove) 
request (This is sensible because, usually, length of a session should be
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considerably smaller than time interval between two successive scheduled 
flights).
2. Suppose the initial state is /i(emove). We expect that reservation re­
quests are served in batches upon arrival of flights.
Therefore, we may expect that ii(emove) input states are clustered. But, 
before each /¿(emove) we may check the information about the customer 
(his/her class-type and seat request).
Thus, we may expect that, starting with a i?(emove) recpiest, another 
i?(emove) in conjunction with U(isplay) request will be more likely to 
follow one another during the session.
Estimation of Total Number of Faults within the Program
There are some formulas which roughly estimate number of faults in the pro­
gram. Some statistical experiments show that number of faults are related to 
the total number of instructions in the program [18], [31].
On the other hand, we may inspect similar projects completed by the same 
programming team in the past. Number of faults that the coding team fixed 
in previous projects may help us to estimate skills of the programmers. Some 
regression analysis may be applied to estimate number of faults within the 
program by projecting from past data.
Selection of Distribution of Size of Fault Sets
The radius of every fault set represents the size of the fault set. We can use 
test data coming from the similar projects to fit a distribution to the size of 
fault sets.
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2.4.4 Some Concluding Remcirks
Our softwax'e reliability model presupposes identification of input space, path 
sets, initial state distribution, and state transition functions.
In this section, we illustrated how they can be materialized. But, there is 
no strict guidelines that apply to application of the model: A practitioner may 
not list, for example, all possible input states to include in input space. He 
may want to concentrate on some particular part of the software, and, does 
not study some particular instruction paths of the software. This could be 
the case when program reused some modules that were developed and tested 
befoi’ehand.
Design errors and random failures cannot be handled by our model. The 
best way of handling design errors is a well study of customers’ expectations 
and true materialism of them into program specification. Random failures may 
be incorporated into the model by using random sets concept. Fault sets can 
be thought as random sets. But, we left this extension to the future.
Chapter 3
Mathematical Model of 
Software Failure Process and 
Softwcire Reliability
In Chapter 2, it was stated that a software failure occurs if an inherent fault 
of the software is agitated by an input state. We described this phenomenon 
in terms of fault sets: A software failure occurs upon execution of a particular 
input state if the input state falls into one of the fault sets.
We devote Section 3.1 to the computation of the probability that a given 
input state falls into (at least) one of the fault sets, that is, causes a software 
failure. The input space was considered to be the unit square in V?. However, 
due to technical complications as we described in Subsection 3.1.2, we represent 
the input space by the line segment [—1,1] C 7?. in this chapter.
In Section 3.2, we give a criterion that determines the order of the path sets 
in the line segment [—1,1]. We, also, illustrate on the sample programming 
environment that we studied in Chapter 2 how to apply this criterion.
Finally in Section 3.3, we combine the results coming from the first two 
sections with the guidance of the model frame we presented in Chapter 2
58
into the complete stochastic model of software failure process and software 
reliability.
3.1 Marginal Contribution of a Software Fail­
ure to the Software Reliability
Each time a software failure occurs, we remove some fault sets from the input 
space. In order to estimate the improvement in the software reliability, we 
should determine total size of all fault sets removed. Given a particular input 
state which causes a failure, to estimate size of the fault sets removed, we need 
to know
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• number of fault sets that covers the input
• size of each fault set that covers the input
Because the failure process is random, those quantities are actually ran­
dom variables. Therefore, we can make inferences only about their probability 
distributions.
In Subsection 3.1.1 below, the input space is represented by a line-segment, 
[—n, n] for some fixed n G in TZ. Fault sets are modeled with line-segments 
whose centers are distributed according to a Poisson process and whose radii 
are i.i.d. random variables. The size of a fault set is defined as the radius of 
the line-segment.
In Subsection 3.1.2, the extension of the model on TZ to TZ!^ \s discussed.
3.1.1 Probability Distribution of the Number of Fault 
Sets that Cover a Given Input State
We start this section with a result in the spatial theory of Poisson Processes 
stated in
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P roposition  1 Consider line-segments on the real line,7Z, with mid-points dis­
tributed according to a Poisson distribution with parameter A | J| where |7| rep­
resents the length of line segment J . Suppose that the radii of the line segments 
are distributed according to the distribution function H{r') with density h{r), 
and, have finite first moment. For some fixed n G bf, let K„, be the number of 
line segments whose centers are in [—n,n]. Let Mn (r) be the number of line 
segments with centers in [—n,n\ that covers the point r G [—n, n]. Then, for  
every r G [—n,n\,
Mn (f) ~  Poisscm {2nXpn (r))
where
Pn (r) =  ^
"n + r  n -r
J  \ \ -H i:y )]d y+  J  [\ -H {y )]d x j  
.0 0
P roof. By the hypothesis, K„ ~  Poisson (2nX). Given that Kn =  k, let 
C [,C ‘2 , ■ ■ ■ ,Ck denote the centers of line-segments 1, 2 ,.. .  A:, and, /¿i, /¿2 , · · · , Rk. 
be their respective radii. It follows that Ci ~  Uniform  (—n ,n ),i  =  1, 2 ,3 , . . . ,  A; 
when we conditioned on Kn =  k. Suppose that (r) denotes the conditional 
probability that the z-th line segment covers the point r, i =  1 ,2 ,3 ,. . . ,  A;, given 
that Kn =  k. Note that pn (?’) is independent of i because Ri, R2 , . . .  , Rk. are 
i.i.d. distributed:
Pn{r) =  P {\ C \ -r\ < R i\ K n  =  k}
n
=  P {R i> \ x - r \ )d x
J_
2n
T n
J  P  {Ri > r  — x }  dx -f- dx
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_1_
J_
/  P { R i > y } d y +  J  P { I { , > y } d y
0 0
n-\-r n - r
I  [1 - H { y ) ] d y +  I  [1 -H {y ) ]d y (3.1)
0 0 
Note that the expression of (r) is independent of k for every '/· G [— 
Therefore, for every fixed r G [-ri, n], the event that ¿-th line segment whose 
mid-point is in [—n,n] and contains the point r is a bernoulli trial with the 
success probability (r), i =  1, 2 , . . . ,  /c. Therefore, the conditional probability 
distribution of ('/") given Kn =  A: is
P  { M„ (r) =  m I =  A} =  [p„ (,■))”■ (1 -  (r)]‘ - ’“ , m =  0 ,1 .2 , . . . ,  fc
(3.2)
and, by the Total Probability Law, (r) ~  Poisson (2nXpn (r)), that is,
P {M n  (r) =  m } =  [2^ -^ Pn (r)] ^ - 2nxpn(r)^  ?n =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . . ,  A; (3.3)
?Ti.
Corollary 2 Considei' same line segments on TZ as described in Proposition
1. Then the number of line segments (whose centers are not necessarily in 
[—7i, n\) that cover an arbitrary point r G TZ is a Poisson random variable with 
the parameter 2A f ^  rh (r) dr.
Proof. The distribution function of the random variable of interest is the 
limiting distribution function of M„ (r), given by the Equation 3.3, as oo ■
Note that, Mn =  {Mn (r) : —n < r <  r¿}, where M„. (r) is defined as in 
the Proposition 1, is a non-homogeneous Poisson Process with the time index, 
r G [—n, n], position of the point in the line segment [—n, n.], and, intensity 
function
S„ (r) = 2nApn (r)
A
n-i-r n - r
j  [ i - J  [1 -H (y ) ]d y (3.4)
The results we explored by the Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 are very useful 
in finding the probability distribution of the number of fault sets that covers a 
given input state.
Suppose that we represent the input space by the line segment [—'n, n] for 
some fixed n G M  (we, later, let n =  1). We assume that the number of inherent 
faults of the software is known and equals to k. We represent the fault sets by 
the line segments whose centers are distributed according to a Poisson process 
and radii are i.i.d. random variables with the distribution function H . We 
assume that H  is absolutely continuous and h is its density function. Then, 
the notation we used can be restated in terms of our model’s components:
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K n
r
Mn (r)
th e  n u m b er o f  fa u lts  in  th e  softw are  
an in p u t s ta te  o f  th e  so ftw are, r  G [— n , n] 
th e  n u m b er o f  fa u lt sets th a t  covers th e  in p u t  
sta te  r ,  r G [— n , n]
and, for every fault set,
R =  rad iu s (i.e . h a lf-le n g th ) o f  th e  fa u lt set  
C =  center (i.e . m id -p o in t )  o f  th e  fa u lt  set  
(i') =  co n d itio n a l p ro b a b ility  th a t th e  fa u lt set c on ta in s
th e  in p u t sta te  r G [— n , n ] , g iven  th a t th ere  are  
Kn — k fau lts  in  th e  softw are
Note that in this case, the distribution of the number of fault sets that cover 
the input state r G [—'ft, ftj is given by the Equation 3.2. In the remaining part 
of this subsection, we study the properties of this distribution function to some 
extent.
P roposition  3 For every n G H , and, r G \—n,n], pn (r )  is a concave fa'nclion 
of r, and it attains its maximum at r =  0.
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Proof. By the equation 3.1,
J  [1 -  / /  (t/)] d-V+ j  [1 -  ff (</)l dy
L 0 0
Because we assumed that H  is an absolutely continuous distribution function, 
•pn {’>') hiis first two derivatives. Then
^ P n (r) =  ^  [ / / (n -  r) -  i-/(n  +  r)]
2n (3.5)
¿ [ R ( n  +  | r | ) - / / ( . « - M ) ] ,
—L· ( "  +  ’■) r ) ] ,
- n  < r <  0 
0 < '/■ < n
d'^  1
^  [/ (^n — r) +  h{n +  r)] for every r G [—n, n] (3.6)
where H  is the distribution function and h is density function of R. Note 
that ^ P n (r) <  0 for every r G [—n^ n\ due to the fact that every density 
function is a non-negative real-valued function. Therefore Pn{') is a concave 
function. On the other hand, is an increasing function on the interval 
(—n,0) and a decreasing function on the interval (0,n) because H  is non­
decreasing. Moreover, ^„(r) is differentiable at r =  0, and, ’£:Pn{'i') |r:==o= 0. 
Therefore, r =  0 is the maximal extremum of the pn (?’) ■
By the Proposition 3, we learn that we can distinguish the input states 
from each other in terms of their tendency to cause a software failure. This 
fact helps us to represent the logical complexities of different paths of computer 
instructions in the code of the software by means of the path sets. We leave 
the details to the next section. We shortly want to turn back to Corollary 2 
and interpret it: If a software has a huge input space and a very large number 
of fai.ilts and if the size of a fault set is negligible in comparison with the input 
space, then every input state has the same chance to cause a software failure. 
In other words, every fault-fixing-activity contributes in the same amount to 
the software reliability growth in the early times of the debugging phase.
Proposition 4 For every n G Rf, and, r G [— n ,n ] ,
(a) pPn{0) < Pn{-n) = Pn{n) < Pn{0) < — (3.7)
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Pn(r)
*■ r
Figure 3.1: Sketch of p(r)
(b) Pn{0) Pn{r) <  2 ^^ (3.8)
(c) If P  {0 < R < n} =  1 then
p„(0) =  andpn{n) =
Γ¿ T^h (3.9)
(d) If ER < oo then,
, , ER  
P n { r )  0 as —)■ 0 
n (3.10)
•where ER is the expected value of R.
Proof. (a) It is easy to see that Pn{—n) =  pn(n). On the other hand
and
Then
p„.(0) -  pn(n)
f p { R > y } d y  +  J p { R > y } d y
.0 0
-  I  P { R > y } d y
Tl/ J
2n
= P l R > y ] d y
2n
n 2n
2 j p { R > y } d y - J p { R > y } d y  
. 0 0
(3.11)
(3.12)
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n 2ri\
2J P { R > y } d y -  l J  +  J \ p { R > y } d y  
_ 0 Vo n /
" n 2n
j  P {R >  2/ }  dy -  J  P {R > y] dy
.0 n
< i j p { R > y } “ v
And it follows that
^Pn(O)
Pn(0) -  -  -^ " (0)
^Pn(O) < Pn(n) < p„,(0)
(3.13)
(3.14)
The second inec[uality in 3.14 follows from Proposition 3. On the other hand,
,(0) =  - [ p { R > y } d y  
n J 
0
oo
< - [ p { R > y } d y  (3.15)
Th J
P n
0
ER
n
(b) By the inequality 3.13
P n { 0 ) - P n { n )  <  -^PniO)
< ER
2n
(c) If P  {0 < / i  <  n}  — 1. Then
OO
J  P { R > y } d y  =  0.
n
Therefore, equality holds in 3.15.
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(d) If ER < oo then
n
j [ ^- H{ y) ]dy
0
n
ER >  y  [1 “  (y)] every n E N
0
Therefore,
ER
ri (3.16)
0 <p„{r )  =  -  h i - H ( y ) ] d y <
/7/ J 
0
By Proposition 3, for every r G [—n^n]
0  <  P n { r )  < P n ( 0 )
and, by 3.16, it follows immediately that p„(r) ^  0 ■
As Littlewood pointed out in his Conceptual Model, the size of all fault 
sets is actually very small in comparison with the size of input space. The 
assumption that the size (i.e. radius) of any fault set is almost surely less 
than half size of the input space is highly reasonable. If the programmers 
are highly qualified, we may expect that the size of a fault set is considerably 
small compared with the size of the input space. Even if this is not true, the 
faults that have huge sizes will be immediately fixed and removed from the 
software at the very beginning of the debugging phase. Therefore, we will not 
be concerned with the unusual case where fault sets are huge, and, we assume 
in the rest of our study that P {0  < /{  < n} =  1, and, express Pn{0) and Pn{ri) 
as in Equation 3.9. Those expressions are very useful because we need to make 
inference only about relative expected size of a fault set. Furthermore, 
choosing a particular value of n G V  to model the input space by [—n, n] also 
becomes a trivial task. We can study with any value of n G V  once we decide 
on the ratio ^  because we can proportionally adjust the size of the fault sets.
Now, we will look for similar expressions of Pn.{T) for arbitrary r G [—ri, //,]. 
By Littlewood’s conclusion, we expect that ER n, or, is very close to 
zero. We present the Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 to show how the graph 
of Pn{·) behaves as converges to zero. We, especially, observe that as
converges to zero, Pn(0) — Pn{'f') becomes smaller and smaller. Therefore, we 
expect that, in a professional software development environment, the curve of 
Pn{·) is reasonably flat. We believe that the graph of p„(·) on the line segments 
[—n, 0] and [0, n] can be well approximated separately by the line segments (see 
Figure 3.2).
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Pjr)
Figure 3.2: Approximation of p(r)
By using the similar triangles, we can compute approximate values for p„(7·), 
r G [—n,n]. If — n < r < 0 then
p J r ) -E R / 2 n  r +  n 
ER/2n ~  n
Pnjr) _  r +  2n
If 0 < r < n then
n
P n { r )
Pn{r) -  ER/2n 
n
P n { r )
n
]R{r +  2n)
2n^
n — r
n
2n -  r
ER/2n n
ER{2n -  r)
Pn(r) ~ 2n2
To summarize, we suppose
. , , E R ‘^  if - n < r < 0
 ^ E R ‘^  if 0 < r < n
(3.17)
(3.18)
(3.19)
Now, turn back to the conditional distribution of iU „(r), r E M. By a 
well known theorem in the probability theory, for every fixed r  G [— n, n], as 
Vni'f') 0, and. A: ^  oo in the Equation 3.2, such that k ■ Pn{r) —>■ fin (?’), for 
some positive real valued constant (r),
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P  {Mn{r) =  m I Kn =  k]
m! (3.20)
Therefore, given that Kn =  k, conditionally Mn{r) ~  Poisson(fj,n{‘f’)) is a very 
good approximation when k is very large and Pn{0) is very small. Remember 
that we assumed P  {0 < R < n} =  1. Then r G [—n,n].
k-Pnir) =
if - n < r < 0n zn —
if 0 < r <  nT n>2n - r-E R -71 2n
(3.21)
Let p, =  f^ER. We may interpret p, as the expected size of all fault sets per
unit area of the input space. More precisely,
k A; ^ size of the union of the all fault sets
p =  - E R  =  — E (2R) --------------- -^-----r— ------ -^------------------  3.22
n 2n size of the input space
If the input space is finite, then the size of the union of all fault sets equals
to the total number of all input states that triggers a fault, and, similarly, the
size of the input space is the total number of all input states. As ER. 0
size of the union of the all fault sets
p - ----------- -^-----FT— ------;-------------------  -^ 0  3.23size of the input space
because as ER  coverges to zero, the number of intersecting fault sets converges 
to zero and k ■ E {2R) converges to the number of all input states that trigger 
a fault. Therefore, we may think that, if ER  is close to zero, p represents the 
ratio of size of the union of the all fault sets to the size of the input space which 
is less than one.
We may expect that p represents the programming abilities of the code 
developers. Therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that p is constant during 
a time interval when the learning effect is negligible. Thus, if ER, expected 
size of a fault set, is considerably small compared with k, the number of faults 
in the program before the debugging phase starts (that is, k ER), then 
given that =  k, conditionally.
Mnir) Poisson{pn{r)), V G [—n,n] (3.24)
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is a good approximation where
Hn{r) =  k ■ Pn{r), r e [ - n ,n ]
if —n <  r < 0 
/^ 2^^  0 < r < n
For compactness, we write
2n -  |r|
n < V < n
(3.25)
(3.26)
Approximation the conditonal distribution of M„,{r) by 3.24 has one im­
portant practical consequence. In this case, the distribution function of Mn(r), 
r G [—n,n], is completely known once we estimate fi. On the other hand, the 
interpretation of //, as we give above, is easy to understand for the software 
managers. Moreover, they do not need to estimate k and E li separately to 
compute fi. They can directly estimate /i by a simple statistical procedure.
Estimation of p
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Let r[ , r2 ,r·^,. . .  ,rs be s independent 
input states selected uniformly from the input space, and Sf be the number of 
input states among r i ,r 2 ,?’3 , · · · , ‘>’s that cause a software failure, 0 < Sf < s. 
Let ^ denote the union of all fault sets, and,
^  (e ) { ^ * 1 ,2 , . . . ,  A’
0 if n  ^ ^
(3.27)
Then
=  (3 28)
Note that, by 3.24, given that the input state Vi G [—n,n] is executed by the 
software, a software failure occurs with the probability
P  {'/’i e  S' I n )  =  1 -  e for every i =  1 ,2 ,... , a (3.29)
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fJ'MLE IL■s fJ'MLE £X ¡J'MLE •s fJ’MLE
0 3 X 10-^® 0.30 0.47875 0.60 1.2431 0.90 3.2103
0.05 7 X 10-2 0.35 0.57903 0.65 1.4280 0.95 4.2347
0.10 0.14076 0.40 0.68766 0.70 1.6426 1 -  10-1« 40.057
0.15 0.21735 0.45 0.80613 0.75 1.8981 1 -  10-1«« 449.69
0.20 0.29876 0.50 0.93635 0.80 2.2133 1 -  10-®«« 2288.5
0.25 0.38564 0.55 1.0809 0.85 2.6238 1 —
Table 3.1: Likelihood Estimates of /i
Because the input states r i ,r 2 ,'/‘3 , . . .  ,Vs are uniformly selected from the input 
space, for every i =  1,2, . . .  ,s,
P i n e s }  ■
-  1
1 r  L -u^ ZLdrl"
2 n .l-n [ \
1 1
— \2 n- 2  /  e 2n dr
2n 1L J o
1 ri ■
2n -  An / e-f^^du
2n / 12
 - -  (e - 2 -  e-^‘)/i V ^
(3.30)
Thus, for every i =  1,2, . . .  ,s.
P  { I  in) =  l }  =  P { n e d }  =  l - -  (e  ^ -  e-^‘)
Therefore, the random functions J ( r i ) , J ( r 2 ) , . . . ,  J (r«) are actually i.i.d. 
Bernoulli random variables with the success probability given by Equation 
3.31. In the statistical theory, it is well-known that the MLE of the success 
probability of a Bernoulli random variable is the sample mean. On the other- 
hand, we also know that MLE of a monotone function of the parameter to be 
estimated is the value of that function evaluated at the MLE of the parameter. 
Thus,
^  =  1 -------—  (3.32)
S  fJ^M LE ^ ^
We can solve the Equation 3.32 for [j-mle, the MLE of /r. For illustration, we 
numerically solved Equation 3.32 for various values of ^  by using MAPLE (see 
Table 3.1). As ^  increases to 1, [J-mle converges fast to infinity.
We can immediately find the likelihood function of given r i , '/'2 , »’3 , ■ ■■ ,i's·
C H A P T E R  3. M ATH EM ATICA L M ODEL OF SO FTW AR E FAILURE PROCESS AN D  SO FTW AR E R ELIABILITY 71
It is given by
£ ( / i  I = 2 /----- le 2
S  — S f
(3.33)
We may alternatively find the MLE of fj, by maximizing 3.33. But, we are pri­
marily interested in the shape of log likelihood function, log £  (/i | , ?2 , . . . ,  r,,).
p Values
0 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71 0.81 0.91 1
Figure 3.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of p
In Figi.ire 3.3, we illustrate how the MLE of ¡.i can be found by using 
3.33. As an example, we suppose that we uniformly take 50 independent in­
put states from the input space. To show how the shape of the logarithm 
of the £(/U I ri, r‘2 , . . . ,  r«) changes as S/ changes, we plot the function for 
Sf =  0, 6’/  =  5,6’/  =  10, s / =  15 and Sf =  20. For every case except Sf =  0, 
the MLE of p is indicated by the line segments vertical to the corresponding 
curve at its maximum in the figure. When Sf =  0, the log likelihood function 
increases to a number very close to zero, then, makes a steep downward turn. 
In order to illustrate how the log likelihood function behaves for the values of 
p closer to zero, we divide the Figure 3.3 into two parts. In the first part, we 
plot the function for [0,0.01] and in the second part, we plot it for [0.01,1]. 
Note that the scales of those two parts are different. In the mean time, we
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saw that the MLE of ^ found by solving Equation 3.32 and by maximizing log 
L [ji I ,V2 , , Ts) are the same.
A  Practical Approach. In the case that we have some reasons to believe 
that // is considerably close to zero, we can develop a practical estimator which 
can be easily used by the non statisticians.
Consider, again. Equation 3.29. In general, we know that, for a real number, 
which is close to zero, e "“’ 1 — x is a very good approximation. Apply this
approximation to Equation 3.29. Then, for every i =  1,2, . . .  , s,
P { r i e d \ r i }  =
=  1 -  (1 -  /in (n))
~  l-^ n O’i)
(3.34)
In 3.34, we completely ignore the error in our approximation. Therefore, from 
3.35, it follows that
P i n e d }  =  E [ P { n e d \ n } ]  
=  2^
1 /■" 2n -  \r
(3.36)
= -  f2n J-- n ^ 2n dr
(3.37)
Thus, for the very small values of /J, X (j'l) ,X  ('/'2 ) ,··■ ,X ('/’,,) are i.i.d. Bernoulli 
random variables with the success probability |/i. By the Strong Law of Large 
Numbers and the Equation 3.28,
a.a. 6—---- >· —li as 6' ^  0 0
s 4
(3.38)
By 3.38, we may use | ^  for large s E Ai as a rough estimate of fi. We
compared ^  to the MLE of ¡.i. Table 3.2 lists the estimates of /x given by ^
and MLE of fx for the different values of ^ . The estimator ^  performs nearly 
as good as the maximum likelihood estimator when Sj- is considerably smaller 
than s. In Table 3.2, the estimates given by and MLE of fx are very close
C H A P T E R  3, M ATH EM ATICA L M ODEL OF SO FT W AR E FAILURE PROCESS AN D  SO FT W AR E R ELIABILITY 73
Í1
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
4s/
0.066
0.080
0.093
0.106
0.09 0.120
fJ'MLE
3 X 10-^“
0.068
0.083
0.096
0.111
0.126
0.10
0.12
0.15
0.20
0.30
i n3.1
0.133
0.16
0.200
0.266
0.400
0.50 0.666 0.936
fJ-MLE
0.140
0.171
0.217
0.299
0.479
Table 3.2: Comparison of Estimators of fi
to each other when the ratio -^is less than 0.15. When we closely look to the 
estimates of fj, corresponding to those particular values of , we may conclude 
that if the real value of /J, is less than 0.20, then ^  performs as well as MLE 
of ^ and we may use ^  instead of the MLE of /r. In fact, in a real life project, 
we almost never expect that the value of /j. is as large as 0.20. It should be 
fairly close to zero. Alternatively, we may prefer to use the MLE of /r at the 
early part of the debugging phase, and, after a considerable number of faults 
are removed from the software code, we may use ^  to estimate /x.
3.1.2 Extension of the Model constructed on 7^  to a 
Model in V?
We hoped to find nice results similar to what we get in Subsection 3.1.1 when 
we model the input space by the unit square in the two dimensional Euclidean 
space. Our starting point was similar to that we have in the subsection 3.1.1. 
We managed to compute the distribution function of the number of the fault 
sets that cover a particular input state, but, the computations become in­
tractable soon and we could not analyze its behavior on the whole input space. 
We do not know whether this distribution function is also concave and smooth 
or has some other nice properties which may help us to model the structural 
properties of the program. Therefore, we stopped working in Here, we, 
only, give the following result coming again from the spatial theory of Poisson 
Processes.
P rop osition  5 Consider circles on with centers distributed according to a 
Poisson distribution with parameter A|yl| where \A\ represents the area of A. 
If the radii of all circles are distributed according to F\·) with density / ( · ) ,  
and, have finite second moment, then the number of circles that cover a point 
t E is a Poisson random variable with parameter ttA /  r^f (r)dr (Exercise 
5.5.11, page 286 in [37]).
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P roof. First, consider the circle with center at t and radius n >  0. Let
A =  e 7Z‘·^ : (xi -  t i f  +  (.x-2 -  h f  <
K (n) =  number of centers in A  
M{n)  =  number of the circles with centers in A 
that covers point t.
Given K{n)  =  k, let C^,C^,. . . ,  be centers of circles i =  1,2, . . .  ,k, and, 
II], R-2 ,. .. ,Rk be their respective radii. Then
P  { M{n)  =  m } = Y ^ P  {M{n)  =  rn I K{n)  =  j }  P  {K{n)  =  j }  (3.39)
j - r n
Note that K{n)  ~  Poisson{Tvn^X) and given that K{n)  =  k, conditionally,
C* ~  uniform{7rn^X), i =  1,2, . . .  ,k
Then
P  {circle i covers point t | K{n)  =  k}  —
=  P[ \\c^- t \\<Ri \K{ n)  =  k}
= ^  ^  -  \/(^ i -  t l f  + {X‘2 -  ¿2)^ 1 dX]dx-2
=  j j  p  j-Ri > \ l z \ p  dz]dz2
{^ 1-|-2|<n2 j.
n  27T
0 0
2 7
=  —J r P { R i > r } d r
Th J
dOdr
(3.40)
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Note that Ri's are i.i.d. random variables. Therefore, p{n)  ^ probability that 
a circle contains t given that K{n)  =  /b, is same for every i =  1, 2 ,. . .  ,/i: and 
ec[uals to
2 "■
3  / ' ' ’ [ I -P 'i'f')]To J
dr
Therefore, given K{n)  =  /c, conditional distribution of M (n) is Binomial{k,p{n)). 
It is easy to show that unconditionally
Observe that
M(n)  ~  Poissan{XTrn^p{n))
■n
\'Kn^p{n) =  / r  [1 — F  (r)] dr
J 
0
n
2 y  7· [1 -  F (·/·)] dr=  Att
On the other hand
oo no r
J r ‘^ f{'r)dr ^  J  J  2yf{r)dydr
0 0 0
oo oo
= 2 J  12yf{r)drdy
0 y
OO r  'OO
dy[ y  f  f{r)dr
b ly
oo
2 j y [ l  -  F  {r)]dy
Because <  oo, by hypothesis,
n
lim 2 f  y [ l - F  (r)] dy =n—>oo J 
0
So it follows that
X'Kri^p{n) AttFF^  as n ^  oo
(3.42)
(3.43)
(3.44)
(3.45)
(3.46)
Thus the number of circles that cover point t € is distributed as Paisson{X'KEIF)
3.2 Arrangement of Path Sets in the Input 
Space
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We postponed explaining how the path sets, once determined after examining 
the program structure, should be arranged in the input space until we presented 
our findings on the distribution function of the number of fault sets that covers 
a given input state. The reason should be obvious: We cannot always dictate 
the model in what it should do. We can only specify the initial conditions and 
the assumptions that describe the variables and their relationships with each 
other. Thereafter, we should let the model work. After observing the output 
of the model, we can either improve the model or start working from scratch 
depending on whether the output agrees with our expectation or not.
Because, we are primarily interested in the path sets in this particular 
section, we discuss first the implications of our model about the path sets and 
try to see whether the model itself gives some hints about the problem of path 
set arrangement.
First implication of the model about the path sets is aroused by the assump­
tion that center of fault sets are distributed according to a Poisson distribution: 
The larger a path set (that is, the larger the number of input states that exe­
cute the instruction path), the bigger the expected number of fault sets whose 
centers fall into that path set.
This is sensible when we think of a software: We expect that a programmer 
develops a computer code in such a way that it is able to manipulate all possible 
input states that the user of the program may enter. Program should be able 
to work propeiiy (that is, not lose the control of execution) whatever the input 
state is. Therefore, programmer should teach the computer how to handle ev­
ery input state satisfactorily. But, a successful programming may be expected 
to become harder as the number of possible input states increases. Danger 
of missing some possible input states from the consideration increases as the 
number of input states increases. Those inputs which are not considered in
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the design phase of the software may cause the program to give unpredictable 
output states. That is, we may expect the number of faults in a path of com­
puter instructions increases as the number of possible input states executing 
that instruction path increases. Thus, our model agrees with our expectation. 
On the other hand, there is no reason for believing that the size of a path set 
determines its location in the input space.
Our next observation is related to pn (·), the conditional probability that a 
given input state is covered by a fault set. We observed that closer an input 
state is to the center of [—n, r¿], more likely it is covered by a fault set. In other 
words, the closer an input state is to the center of the input space, the more 
likely the software fails upon the execution of the input state. Eventually, a 
path set assigned to the center of the input space contains the worst input 
states in the sense that they are more critical than the others in terms of 
software reliability.
On the other hand, we may expect that a program is more likely to fail 
when, in particular, one of its instruction path which contains complex logical 
expressions, conditions, calculations, etc. is executed by the computer. An 
instruction path in the pi'ogram which is developed to teach the computer a 
hard and complex task is likely to contain more pitfalls. Logical errors may be 
more intensive within the code of an instruction path designed to do complex 
tasks. Therefore, it is logical to locate the path set corresponding to the most 
complex instruction path to the center of the input space, that is, line segment 
[—n, n]. Similarly, we put every other path set as close as possible to the center 
of the input space starting from the most complex to the simplest.
Thus, we restate our criterion to arrange the path sets in the input space: 
The more complicated an instruction path is (or larger the number of the 
instructions it contains), closer its path set is to the center of the input space 
(that is, to the center of the line segment [—n, n]).
Here, we do not prefer a particular measure of complexity. Actually, we are 
not familiar with all of the software complexity measures. It may be the best 
to ask the software engineers who take part in the design of the software to
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P511 p521 p531 p541
p 5 I2  P522 p532 p542
p55
P2
P3
P 4
Pi
Table 3.3: List of Path Sets of the Sample Program in the Order of Complexity
determine the complexity of each instruction path in the software.
We will, now, illustrate how to use our criterion on the sample software we 
studied in Chapter 2.
We already found all path sets of the program and their sizes in Section 2.4. 
Because the code of the program is large, we are unable to discuss in detail 
how we judge the complexity of each instruction path. We first give the list of 
the path sets in the order of complexity, from the most complex, to the least 
complex (see Table 3.3).
Each of the first two lines in Table 3.3 contains path sets which we could not 
distinguish from each other in terms of their complexities. The sample program 
is so simple that the number of path sets is very small. Furthermore, a very 
limited number of tools out of the rich collection of commands supplied by the 
Pascal programming language are used to design the program. Therefore, we 
could not distinguish the path sets in the first two lines from each other in terms 
of their complexities. Their flow diagrams are identical. Those instruction 
paths are nearly the same except a few lines. This difficulty, therefore, arises 
mainly because we kept the program simple enough for illustrative purposes. 
Other instruction paths are compared in terms of the number of instructions 
and involved logical expressions each contains.
In the next step, we map each path set into the line segment [—1,1] by using 
the ranking we presented in Table 3.3 in terms of their complexities: Complex 
path sets are closer to the center of the line segment. Paths which cannot 
be distinguished from each other in terms of their complexities are located
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Path Set Size of the Path Set Lower Bound Upper Bound
0.358 -1 -0.642
Pr>V2 0.135 -0.642 -0.507
P.'ui 0.242 -0.507 -0.265
p521 0.242 -0.265 -0.023
p531 0.242 -0.023 0.219
P54l 0.242 0.219 0.461
P522 0.135 0.461 0.596
p532 0.135 0.596 0.731
P.542 0.135 0.731 0.866
P2 0.005 0.866 0.871
P3 0.005 0.871 0.876
P4 0.005 0.876 0.881
Pi 0.116 0.881 0.997
Table 3.4: Arrangement of the Path Sets of the Sample Program
in arbitrary sequence among themselves. For every different sequencing, we 
may later get different computational results. But, the differences should be 
negligible. Indeed, pn (r), probability that the input state r G [—1,1], is covered 
by a fault set is rather flat, and, the difference between the values of p„, (·) for 
two input states coming from two neighboring path sets is negligible, especially 
when the sizes of the path sets are small (this is the case for the most of the 
real life projects). Finally, we will see that p„. (■) plays the major role in the 
vital expressions describing reliability of a software.
After some trial and error, we conclude that the arrangement, figured out 
as in the Table 3.4, is the best partition of the input space that reflects the 
complexity ranking of the instruction paths.
3.3 The Mathematical Model of the Software 
Reliability
In Section 3.1.1, we worked out the stochastic nature of contribution of a single 
debugging session to the reliability improvement. We assumed that upon a
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failure of the software, number of faults removed from the software is random. 
Under reasonable assumptions, we derived the distribution function of number 
of faults removed after a single debugging session isolated from many others.
In this section, we combine those results we get in the previous sections with 
the dynamics of the software failure process into a Markov Renewal Process. 
Thus, we will be able to analyze the reliability growth of software as time 
evolves.
We let n =  1, and, model the input space by [—1,1]. For convenience, we 
drop subscript n from M„(·), and, Pn{·) when n =  1. Then
P (r) =
E R ^  if -1 <  r < 0
E R ^  if 0 < r <  1
'k'
(3.47)
P  [M  (?’) =  m \ K  =  k} =  [1 “  P(’ ·)]* (3.48)
where 0 < m < k. Furthermore, if it is given that K  =  k, and, k~:^ p (r) then, 
conditionally, M  (r) ~  Poisson {¡xir)) where
k E R ^  if - 1 <  r <  0
^ı{r) =
k E R ^  if 0 <  r <  1
(3.49)
There are two important points that we need to clarify before proceeding 
further. First one is related to the distribution of the centers of remaining 
fault sets after a fault is fixed and removed from the software code. As faults 
are removed from the software, the fault sets within the input space eventually 
disappear. But, center of the remaining fault sets after each debugging activity 
will still be distributed according to a Poisson process (with a different mean) 
because set of points (that is, input states) that cannot be the center of some 
fault sets is finite. Therefore, they are probabilistically negligible.
The second point we will make is related with the distribution of radii of 
remaining fault sets. We assumed that distribution of radii of remaining fault 
sets does not change as faults are removed. Remember that radius of a fault 
set represents its size. In general, we expect that size of the remaining fault 
sets tends to decrease as the debugging phase is proceeded.
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-r+I-
■¥r
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Figui'e 3.4: A Sample Input State
To see this, consider the first input state, r, that triggers a failure. Once 
the failure occurs, all fault sets that cover point r are eliminated from the input 
space. Note that, by this convention, diameter of remaining faults after the 
first debugging session should be less than max {1 — r, r +  1} (see Figure 3.4). 
Otherwise, there is a positive pi'obability that some of the remaining fault sets, 
still, cover the point r -which is guaranteed by the debugging activity as to 
be harmless forever-. We may, still, overcome this difficulty by assuming that 
the distribution of radii of fault sets has a finite support of reasonably short 
length compared to line-segment [—1,1]. This may be a good approximation 
especially when design and coding teams are highly experienced.
We begin to construct the mathematical model with
3.3.1 The Description of the Debugging Phase
We suppose that the debugging phase is composed of many test sessions fol­
lowing one after another. A test session represents all activities regarding the 
selection of consecutive instruction paths, execution of input states coming 
from the corresponding path-sets and all data-gathering on execution times, 
output states, etc. until the next software failure occurs. A test session is same 
as a debugging cycle that we defined in Chapter 2.
Here, we give details about test sessions:
1. A test session stops when the next software failure occurs. Thereafter, a 
new test session starts.
2. When a test session stops with a software failure, the next test session
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starts with an initial path set. The initial path set is selected according 
to an initial state distribution which is common to all test-sessions.
3. Once the initial path set of a test session is determined, we uniformly 
select an input state from that path set, and, run the software with the 
selected input state. If the software fails, we continue debugging with a 
new test session. If the output of the software is satisfactory, we deter­
mine the next path set according to the one-step transition probability 
matrix of the Markov Chain governing the transitions between the path 
sets. The initial path set of the test session specifies the transition ma­
trix. Remember that, we assumed that the initial path set characterizes 
the operational environment: It inherits some clues about the intention 
of the user in what particular way s/he is going to use the software.
Once we determine the next path, we, again, uniformly select an input 
state from the corresponding path set, run the software and observe the 
output. If a software failure occurs, we stop the test session and start 
a new one. If the output is satisfactory, we determine a new path set 
and repeat the same procedure until a failure occurs or a predetermined 
stopping condition is satisfied.
4. If the stopping condition is satisfied before a failure occurs, we do not 
start with a new test session and debugging phase is terminated. Debug­
ging phase (i.e. the phase where software faults are fixed and eliminated) 
should be terminated whenever the reliability of the softwai'e is increased 
to a satisfactory level. Remember that reliability of a software is defined 
as the probability that software runs without any failure for a specific 
time. A reliability objective may be stated as that the software should 
run satisfactorily (i.e. without any unsatisfactory output) for a time 
period of, say, Tr units length with probability pri,0 < Pr <  1. Our 
mathematical model helps us to determine a concrete, easy to under­
stand, stopping condition for the debugging phase when Tr and Pr are 
given.
3.3.2 The Mathematical Model for Evolving Software 
Reliability
We will use the following notation:
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M,: =
Mij
7  ’ _  'P
{7T„ : a G ^3} =
N,
Kj =  Number of remaining faults in the program before 
the '¿th test session starts, z =  0,1, 2 , . . .
Kij =  Number of remaining faults in the program before the jth  
input of zth test session is experienced, i , j  =  0,1, 2 , . . .  
Define KiQ =  lKj, z =  0 , l , 2 , . . .
Number of faults fixed and removed at the end of 
session z, z =  0,1, 2,. . .
Number of fault sets that cover the j'th input of zth 
test session, z, j  =  0,1, 2 , . . .  Then M,; =  Mij 
Execution time of an input selected from jth path 
set in the zth test session, i , j  =  0,1, 2 , . . .
Vij =  Path set determined to select jfth input ot zth test 
session from, i , j  =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . .
T5 =  Collection of all path sets.
Pq =  One-step transition probability matrix of the Markov 
Chain that represents selection of successive 
instruction paths given that the initial instruction 
path is O', o; G
Initial state distribution of the Markov Chain 
{Vij : j  G Af} for every i £ Af 
Number of path sets tried until the first software 
failure occurs within the same test session, z =  0,1, 2 , . . .
Si =  Length of zth test session (in time units), z =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . .
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Number ol' 
Remaining 
Faults
K() = k
IKi = ]K() — M() 
IK2 = IK| — Ml
Test Session 0 ^
0
[ Test Session 1 J
[ Test Session 2 J
-52- Time
5() 5() + 5i 5() + 5i + 52
Figure 3.5: The Debugging Phase of a Software
The debugging phase of a software looks as in the Figure 3.5. A number 
of test sessions follow one another until a predetermined stopping condition is 
satisfied. After every test session, a number of faults are fixed and removed 
from the software code.
Figure 3.6 gives the detailed sketches of the first three test sessions of a 
particular software debugging phase. We let Too =  i  10 =  T20 =  . . .  =  0. In 
the most general model, we assume that — Tij, i , j  € A/”, the execution
time of jth  input state of ¿th test session, are independent random variables 
given the path sets Vij and Vij+i- Then the process {{Vij,Tij) : j  G Af} is a 
Mai'kov Renewal Process for every session i,i  — 0 ,1 ,2 , . . .  Note that, here, 
7 o3 ,T i2 ,T 2 4 , . . .  are times between successive software failures in the particular 
realization of this stochastic process. We suppose that the time required to 
fix and remove a fault is negligible. Therefore, the length of a test session is 
simply the sum of execution times of all input states exercised during the test 
session. We also assume that Vio, the initial path set of the Tth test session, 
and, Kj, the number of remaining faults in software before the *-th test session 
starts, are independent random variables for every z =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . .
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Figure 3.6; Evolution of Debugging Phase
The random variables M ·^, i , j  =  0,1, 2 , ,  for every test session % deter­
mine the time passed until the next software failure and the amount of the 
software reliability growth in the following sense: Mij =  0 implies that jth  
input state is covered by no fault set, that is, the program maps the jth input 
of 2th test session to an acceptable output. A test session continues until the 
first time an Mij is positive, and, the value of this Mij indicates how many 
faults are fixed in the source code of the program in that test session. Be­
cause we assume perfect debugging, all those fixed faults are removed and a 
software reliability growth realizes. Additionally, these reliability growths oc­
curred in diflFerent test sessions can be in different amounts because Mjy’s can 
take different values between 0 and Kq.
We may solve the problem by assigning a distribution function with a gen­
eral form to the execution times. But, expressions become mathematically 
intractable in a few steps. Therefore, we start solving the simplest problem.
We assume that the execution time of every input state is constant and
equal to each other. Suppose that execution times are equal to e units of time. 
Then, the picture of evolving debugging phase looks like as in the Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Debugging Phase with Constant and Equal Execution Times
In this simple case, T^’s are no longer random variables. We can define 
a new measure of time in which one unit of time in the new measurement 
system equals to e units of time in the usual metric system. This shows that 
the Markov Chains {Vij : j  =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . . }  for every i, i =  0 , 1 , 2 , ,  completely 
characterize the evolution of the debugging phase. Now, we come up with some 
important expressions:
The conditional probability that software does not fail during the ex­
ecution of the instruction path a G ^  given that there are k inherent 
faults in the software, k — 1 ,2 ,3 ,. . .
Let I<ij =  k, k =  1 ,2 ,3 , . . . ,and, Vij =  a. Remember that cv G 3^ is a path 
set (that is, a line segment completely covered by the interval [—1,1]). Let a
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be the line segment with end points and Ua, - 1  < la < Ua <  1. Then, the 
conditional probability that softwai'e does not fail during the execution of the 
instruction path a; € ^  given that there are k inherent faults in the software 
is given by
1 rUa
P  {Mij =  0 I Kij =  k, Vij =  a } =  — / P  {M  (r) =  0} dr (3.50)
Remember that M  (?·) denotes the number of fault sets that cover the input 
state r G [—1,1]. M  {r) is a I'andom variable for every r G [—1,1], and, 
M  (r) ~  Binomial [k ,p [r)). Thus,
P  [Mij =  0 1 Kij =  k,Vij =  a } =  ------- — / [1 - p { r ) f  dr (3.51)
U/Q^ (jQi ^ loc
= '/.¿Q l(^  j  If
«a I 2 — Irl
1 -  E R ------LJ
1 k
dr
For every path set, we compute the expression above. We denote 
o (a, k) =  P  {Mij =  0 I Kij =  k, Vij — a }
1 n
la dItx
pRcy /  9  —  17 *
1 -  E R — ^
U V 2
k
dr (3.52)
More explicitly.
o (a, k) =
( l  +  i ) ] * " · ' }  i f 1 < la < Ua <  0
■ A"-M
(uc,-la)EB.(k+l)
-  1 - E R
(Ufx-la,)ER(k+l) {
+  [l -  ER  ( l  -
- 2  (1 -  E R f''^ } i f  - 1  < la < 0 <  Ua <  1 
f r  /  \lA:|-l
I [l -  ER  ( l  -
1 -  ER  ( l  -  J i f  0 < la < Ua <  1
(3.53)
{U(x - lot R{k-\-i)
Conditional distribution of Ni given that there are k inherent faults 
in the software, i =  0 , 1 , 2 , ,  k =  1 ,2 ,3 ,...
Let n > 1. Then conditional probability that the software does not fail until 
the {n +  l)-st path set is executed in the *th test session given that the initial
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path set is a; G ф, and, there are k remaining faults before the ¿th test session 
starts is given by
P  {N i >  n +  l  \ Pio =  a ,K i  =  k } =
=  P {M io  =  0, Mo =  0 , . . . ,  Min =  0\ Ріо =  а Л і =  k}
=  P {M io =  0,M a =  0 ,...,M in  =  0,
ai
il —  0¿i f · · · fl^in ~  ) I ^гО —  =  /u j-
=  P  [Pin =  cxn, Min =  0\ K i =  k, Vii) =  a , Mio =  0,
Pil ~  ^1) Mil 0, . . . ^Pin—i — ^^ n-1·) Min-1 ~  Oj-
•P {P il =  cvi, M il =  0 , . . . ,  Pin 1 =  M in-1 =  0 
I =  A:, Pio =  a ,  МІщ =  0}
•P{Mio =  0\ Ki =  k,Pio =  a }
— ^ P  {Pin ~  ^П ’> Min ~  0 I Pin—l ~  Pin ~  A’}
Q 1,..., Ciri,
■P {Vii =  O'!, Mil =  0) · · · ! Vin-l =  « „ - i ,  Min-1 =  b 
I K ¿  =  fc, Vio - a , Mio =  0}
■P {Mio =  0 \ Ki ^  k,Vio =  « }
=  o { a , k )  ^  P a  («n  - i,o ;n )o (« n ,^ )
•P {V il — Oil, M o  =  0 , . . . ,  V in -i =  c^n-i, Phn-\ =  0
I Ki =  k,Vio =  Mio =  0}
=  о (a , k) P  {Vil =  Oil, Mil =  0 , . . . ,  Vin-i =  «„. .i, M¿„, i =  0
ai,...,a„_i
I IKj =  k,Vio =  cx, Mjo =  0}
•J^Pa {an -i,an )o{an ,k )
=  о {a, k) YY Pa (a, cvi) о {a l,k )  · · · X )Pa ( « „ - 1 , «n) о (a„, k) (3.54)
a I OLn
Define the matrix Pa,fc by
Pa,fc {h j)  ■= Pa (b i )  · o(j, /c) for eveiy i , j  G N  (3.55)
Then
P {N i >  Ti +  1 I Vio =  o ,  K j  =  k { —
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ai,...,Q;n
o {a ,k )  Pa,fc(oi,cvi)---P,,,fc(Q;„,_i,a„)
'y ] (^1 ' ' ■ Pa,fc (*^ ri —2) ^n—l)-  o { a , k ) Y
an |_ai,...,Q;n-i
=  o(cY ,k )Y F l^k{a ,an ) (3.56)
where P"_^ . is /¿th power of the matrix P^ f^c (Define P^ ^^  =  -f)· To summarize
Oin
P  [N, > n +  l\Vio =  =  k} =  o {a ,k ) {aJ5) (3.57)
Then
P  {Ni — n P \ I PiQ — q;, — k} —
— P  {Ni ^ I Pio — — k} P  {Ni > 'n +  1 I Pi(} =  cv, =  k}
=  o (a ,k )  ^  (a,/?) -  (a ,P )
ifeip
When n =  1 then
P  {Ni =  1 \ Vio =  Oi,Ki =  k} =  1 -  o (a, k)
(3.58)
(3.59)
Thus
P {N i =  n\Vio =  a ,K i =  k} =  
1 — 0 (a, k) i f  n =  1
o (a, k) E  (« , (0) -  PS,fc (« , ft) i f  n >  2 (3.60)
0 i f  o.w.
Note that the conditional probability that the software fails in the 2-th test 
session during the execution of the nthe path set given that there are k inherent 
faults in the software before the z-th test session starts, equals to
P { N i  =  n\ Ki =  k} =  E [ P { N  = n \ V io ,K i =  k }\ K i =  k]
=  Y  TTaP { A  =  n  I Vio =  a ,  K j  =  A;} (3.61)
aeip
Last equality follows because Vio and K j  are independent random variables. 
Then
P { A i  =  n|Ki =  A;} =
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1 — 'KaO{oL,k) i f  n =  1
a6<p
E  7T,,o(a,A;) E  i f  n > 2  (3.62)a€ip iieV J
0 o.w.
Conditional distribution of Si, the length of the ?>th test session, 
given that there are k inherent faults in the software before the ¿-th 
test session starts, i =  0 ,1 ,2 , . . .  and A: =  1 ,2 ,3 , . . .
For any t >  0, let n G jY  such that ne <  t <  (n +  1) e. Then
i f  n =  l
P {S i > t\ K i  =  k } =  ^
1 -  E  TTaO (a, k)
E  TTaO (a, k) E  (Oi, P) i f  n > 2
a€<p /3e<p
0 o.ui.
(3.63)
Conditional distribution of the number of remaining faults in the 
software after the ¿-th test session given that there are k faults in the 
software before i-th test session starts, z =  0,1,2, . . . ,  and, ;^ =  1,2,3, . . .
We suppose that Ko, number of faults in the program before the debugging 
phase starts, is known. But, lKi,z > 1, are random variables because number 
of faults fixed in every test session cannot be known with certainty before the 
test session stops.
Firstly, note that Kj+j =  Kj — Mj, i >  1. Let k,m. G f f  such that 
0 < m <  k. Then
P  — k — rn I Kj =  /c, Vio =  a }  - 
=  P  {Ki — 'Mi =  k — m I IKj =  k,Vio =  a }
=  P  { M i  =  m  I K j  =  k, Pio =  ex}
-  Ni =  n \ K i  =  k, Vio =  « }
=  P  {Mi =  m \Ni =  n,Ki =  k, Vio =  a ]
■P{Ni^n\Ki =  k,Vio =  a}
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=  E r = i  P {N i =  n\K i =  k, Vi,o =  a }
■ ^  'Pi,n-\ =  i^ \ Ni =  n ,K i=  k, ViO =  « }
• E^eip ^  ^ I =  « ,  Pi.n-i =  i^}
■ p {P i,n -i =  P \ Ni =  n ,K i =  k, Vio =  « }
=  E r i i  ^  =  n  I K i  =  A;, Vifl - a }
• P  {^ i ,n - i  — I P i,n-i — k,Pi^n-i — P }
•P {Vi,n-i =  P I PiO =  Oi}
=  E r = i  ^  =  n\K i =  k, Vio =  a }  (3.64)
• J2^^^P{M i,n-i =  rn I /Cn-i =  =  p }  · {aJJ)
We have already computed P  {Ni =  n | =  A;, Vm ^  a }  by Equation 3.60. On
the other hand,
P  {Mi^n-l — I — P} —
1 i  \ r / \-irn r.·, / \lk — 7n
up Ip
n¥ ik \  
Ji/3 \mj
b > M r i i - p ( > · ) ]  "*■  (3-65)
Denote
o(/3,/b,VTi) — P{M i^n  — I Pi,n k^'Pin /3}
for every i,n  ^ Af. Then for k, ui G A f, 0 < '/n < A;
o (p,k,rn) =
2
(3.66)
(3.67)
2____
lr3)ER\'mJ ER
ER
[ » ' i )
/ w  i , \ P " ( l - r ) ^ - " ' d r
I i'  /1 _
+  J/5H(1-^)^ ^’ \
er (
7-----V -  f 4  /  / “1 /  (1 -  dr, 0 < l/ ,<  Up <  1[up-lD)ER\mJ Jer{\--§-) ^
, - 1  < /  ^ < 0 < Up < 1
Thus
P  =  A: -  ?n I K j  =  A;, Pj,o =  “ } = (3.68)
=  E r = i  P {N i =  n\K i =  k, Pi,o =  « }  E^gqj
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and
P  =  A; -  I K i  =  A;} =
E [P { K i  |_i = k -  m I Ki =  k, n-,„) I K i  =  A;]
E^eip E r = i  ^  I
E (3.69)
3.3.3 A  Stopping Time for the Debugging Phase
We specify our reliability objective as that the software works without fail­
ure for a specified time (with length, say, Tr) with probability pa. We can 
determine the number of faults, kji, that we may leave intact by
|11Q =  A:k} > p« (3.70)
In other words, when we reduce total number of faults in the software to 
k]{, probability that the software does not fail within T'n units of time equals 
to, at least, p/j. Thus, debugging phase may be stopped and the software may 
be released to the market once we eliminate Kq — ka faults in the program.
Equation 3.62 is still very useful together with Equation 3.69 when the 
debugging team wants to evaluate progress in fault-screening pi’ocess. Before 
starting a new test session, they may want to inference about the length of the 
new session, and, the number of faults that would, possibly, have been fixed at 
the end of the session.
Intuitively, we expect that the early sessions of debugging phase may be 
short and the number of faults that are fixed at the end of each of early test 
se.ssions is large. That is, it is highly likely that early test sessions improve the 
software reliability more than the later test sessions. Indeed, because many of 
the faults are removed in early sessions, later test sessions may last longer (i.e. 
time to hit a fault set increases), in the mean time, no more clustered fault 
sets are left. Therefore, during the later sessions, we may fix only one fault per
test session. Therefore, debugging team may be willing to stop testing phase 
before reaching the target number of faults, A;/^ , if they have screened out a 
large number of faults within a short time interval.
This can be the case especially when the length of the next test session is 
expected to be considerably large whereas expected number of faults that would 
have been fixed after the test session is small. Equations 3.62 and 3.69 help the 
debugging team to test their expectations befoi'e making their final decision 
about stopping the debugging phase before Kq — faults are eliminated from 
the software code.
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Similar decision problems may appear especially when a competing com­
pany develops and plans to release a similar software to the market. In such a 
case, the software company wants to release the software to the market as early 
as possible in order not to lose its market share. Thei'efore, they will seriously 
consider shortening the debugging phase either by allocating more sources to 
the debugging activity or adjusting their reliability objective.
Chapter 4
Conclusion
Many software reliability models in the literature do not make use of the in­
herent properties of the software. Instead, they try to fit some general ad-hoc 
probability distribution functions to the particular random variables of interest. 
Therefore, due to ignoring available information about structural properties of 
the software, they pay the cost of additional variability in the estimates of the 
reliability of the software.
We first studied Littlewood’s Conceptual Model of software failure process 
and reliability growth to understand how the debugging phase of a software 
in a real software development environment evolves. Next, we construct our 
mathematical model of the software reliability. Different from the literature, we 
incorporate some structural elements of a software into our model. We particu­
larly modeled the effect of the instruction paths of different logical complexities 
and embedded in the software code on the software reliability growth. The im­
provement in the reliability of the software after a fault is fixed and removed is 
assumed to be a random variable. We allowed that more than one fault can be 
removed from the software code at once. Another contribution of our model 
is the way we modeled potential users’ selection of the input states. In the 
literature, it is common to represent the behavior of the potential users by a 
frequency distribution of the input states, called operational profile. On the 
contrary, we modeled various usage patterns by a number of Markov Chains.
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This feature of the model not only gives a flexibility to represent the behav­
ior of different subclasses of the potential users but also helps the debugging 
team to choose the most effective testing strategy. Every testing strategy can 
be represented by a Markov Chain. Thus, before the debugging team starts 
testing the software, they can compare the performance of alternative testing 
strategies by letting the model work with the Markov Matrices correspond­
ing to every testing strategy and choose the best one. Finally, we propose a 
stopping rule for the debugging phase of a software.
We conclude this study by highlighting some future research directions: 
We may first improve the model’s representativeness of the software debugging 
phase by relaxing some major assumptions. Our most important assumption is 
that every fault that is already fixed is completely removed from the software 
code without generating new faults. This is unrealistic in most cases. The 
model may be modified to incorporate the imperfect debugging.
In this study, we derived the distribution functions of particular random 
variables of interest for the case where the execution times of the input states 
are equal and constant. We can do the same computations by letting the execu­
tion times be random variables having a non-degenerate distribution function.
Another research direction is the construction of a decision support system 
that helps the software managers to decide on the release time of a software. 
There are actually many other critical variables besides the current reliability 
of the software in this decision process. The model can be integrated with 
some other modules to come up with a support system.
One of the active research areas is the development of the software war- 
ra,nty policies. Because of the difference between hardware and software failure 
processes as well as their respective production systems, the warranty policies 
offered for the hardware systems are not applicable for the software products. 
The failure process developed in this study can be incorporated to construct 
models of such policies.
Lastly, the model may be useful in the unification of many available software
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models after the extensions we mentioned above are made. If we can build 
a model that represents the physics of the software debugging phase, we can 
construct analyze the existent software reliability models and comment on when 
a model performs best.
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